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双边不对称信息下叫价显示质量机制研究
Asking Prices as Signals of Quality under Bilateral Asymmetric Information
摘要点击 3280  全文点击 109  投稿时间:2012-03-02  修订日期:2013-08-08
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中文关键词  双边不对称信息 叫价 质量信号 分离均衡
英文关键词  bilateral asymmetric information, asking price, signal of quality, separating equilibrium
基金项目  国家重大社会科学基金项目,国家自然科学基金项目
学科分类代码  
作者单位E-mail
陈志洪 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院 chenzh@sjtu.edu.cn 
钟根元 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院  
管锡展 复旦大学管理学院  
中文摘要
      资产交易前初始叫价(挂牌价)的确定一直是经济学家感兴趣的问题。现有研究认为该初始叫价反映了卖家的私人价值(如保留价格或生产成本),较少讨论其关于共同价值(如资产质量)的信号传递机制。本文在买卖双方存在双边不对称信息背景下,讨论初始叫价显示资产质量的可能性。研究表明:给定交易机会随质量上升而减少的市场条件,改变叫价对卖家存在相反的两种效应——价格效应和交易效应;低质量资产卖家的交易效应对于价格效应的边际替代率更高,使得该博弈的单交性条件成立;给定边界条件满足,博弈存在分离均衡;低质量卖家有动机以低价格向潜在买家显示质量水平,对高叫价待售资产的质量预期更高具有合理性;分离均衡下所有有效交易均能达成,克服了不对称信息下的市场失灵。
英文摘要
      The issue of asking price (AP) before trading has received much attention from economists. Most of the existing literature argues that AP can be used as a signal of the seller’s reservation price or production cost, which is the private value of the seller. Little attention is paid to the relationship between AP and the quality of an asset, which is the common value of the seller. We examine the signaling mechanism of AP under bilateral asymmetric information. We find that, given that trade opportunity shrinks with increasing quality, there are two contrasting effects with the change of AP: the price effect and the trade effect. The marginal rate of substitution between the trade effect and the price effect is higher for the seller with a lower quality asset. This means that the single-crossing condition is satisfied in this bilateral asymmetric information game. Given the boundary condition is satisfied, there is a unique separating equilibrium. A seller with lower quality has incentive to signal the quality with lower AP, and it is reasonable to expect higher quality from assets with higher AP. All possible trades will be accomplished in this unique separating equilibrium despite the informational asymmetry.
相关附件:   审稿意见回复.doc  双边不对称信息下叫价显示质量机制研究-(署名).pdf  修改稿(署名).doc  修改说明.doc  双边不对称信息下叫价显示质量机制研究-2013-04-17(匿名).doc  修改说明.doc
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