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终极控制人、外部治理环境与盈余管理——基于系统广义矩估计的动态面板数据分析
Ultimate controller, external governance environment and earnings management —— Analysis based on dynamic panel data with system GMM estimation
摘要点击 2383  全文点击 65  投稿时间:2012-03-04  修订日期:2013-09-12
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中文关键词  终极控制人;外部治理环境;盈余管理;系统广义矩估计
英文关键词  ultimate controller; external institutional environment; earnings management; system GMM estimation
基金项目  国家自然科学基金(71172136)、教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET -10-0281)、教育部高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金(20120041110048)
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作者单位E-mail
李延喜 大连理工大学管理与经济学部 mrliyx@dlut.edu.cn 
中文摘要
      外部治理环境的改善会约束盈余管理,而终极控制人出于自身私利对盈余管理的作用会有差异。本文基于地区差异视角,以2004-2011年中国沪深两市700家上市公司持续8年的动态面板数据为研究对象,运用系统广义矩估计检验了外部治理环境对上市公司盈余管理的影响,并考察了上市公司终极控制人在其中发挥的作用。研究发现,外部治理环境与上市公司盈余管理均呈负相关关系;不同终极控制人性质及行政级别情况下,外部治理环境对盈余管理的影响存在差异。具体而言,相对于非政府控制上市公司,外部治理环境对政府控制上市公司的盈余管理行为约束力更强。相对于地方政府控制上市公司,外部治理环境对中央政府控制上市公司盈余管理行为发挥着更大的约束作用。以上结果表明终极控制人在外部治理环境与盈余管理关系中发挥着重要的调节作用。本文丰富了盈余管理研究内容,有助于理解导致我国上市公司盈余管理行为差异的制度根源。
英文摘要
      Improvement in the external governance environment can constrain earnings management, and out of personal gains, the ultimate controller can play a different role towards earnings management. From the perspective of external governance environment, this paper applies dynamic panel data consisting of 836 companies listed on Shanghai Exchange and Shenzhen Exchange from 2004 to 2011. We test the impact of external institutional environments on earnings management using a system GMM method, as well as examining the role played by the listed companies’ ultimate controller. The research shows: External institutional environment is negatively correlated to earnings management. The effect of external institutional environment on earnings management varies depending on the characteristics and administrative rank of the ultimate controller. Specifically, external institutional environment plays a significant role in constraining earnings management acts in government-controlled listed companies compared to the listed companies not controlled by the government. Furthermore, external governance environment seems to be more effective in restraining earnings management in listed companies under the control of central government compared to the listed companies under the control of local governments. In summing up, the results above illustrate the crucial role which the ultimate controller can play in regulating external governance and earnings management. This study enriches the research contents of earnings management, thus contributes in understanding the institutional root-cause of the differences in earnings management behaviors among Chinese listed companies.
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