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供应商库存博弈对装配系统的绩效影响研究
The effects of inventory game on the performance of assembly system
摘要点击 4325  全文点击 112  投稿时间:2012-03-07  修订日期:2012-06-06
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中文关键词  装配系统; 信息共享; 博弈理论; 系统绩效
英文关键词  Assembly system; Information sharing; Game theory; System performance
基金项目  国家自然科学基金项目(面上项目,重点项目,重大项目)
学科分类代码  
作者单位E-mail
马士华 华中科技大学管理学院  
唐尧 华中科技大学管理学院 tangyao0512@hust.edu.cn 
关旭 华中科技大学管理学院  
中文摘要
      鉴于供应管理对装配系统的重要意义,本文以VMI管理策略和成本共担机制为背景,研究了信息封闭和信息共享两种环境中多供应商对单制造商的库存博弈问题,以及供应商决策对于零部件库存量和供应链利润分配的影响。此外,通过对比集中模式,给出了提高分散模式绩效的两种途径。研究结果表明:在信息封闭时,供应商对较小库存者的不合理预期会导致决策失误,从而同时损害到制造商和供应商的收益。在保证各参与方期望利润不减和博弈均衡解存在的前提下,信息共享和成本共担比例的调节可以提高分散模式的绩效。如果分散决策能够协同为集中决策,那么在延误成本较高时,集中模式应该采取等量的零部件库存策略,而在延误成本较低时,非等量库存策略会更优,这一结论细分了分散模式向集中模式的改进方向。
英文摘要
      Considering the importance of supply management to assembly system, we model inventory games between suppliers in the setting of VMI policy and cost-sharing. This paper seeks to shed light on the impacts of such games on the less inventory and profit allocation in decentralized system with information-isolating and information-sharing. Centralized system is demonstrated for comparison. Further, two strategies are presented for system performance improving. Our results show that:1)In the case of information isolating , the inaccurate guesses for less-inventory holder between suppliers can lead to wrong decision making, thus damaging the expected profit of gamers. And the degree of this damage relates to suppliers’ confidence. 2)With existence of Nash equilibrium guaranteed, information sharing and the modulation of the cost-sharing ratio can help improve the entire performance. This conclusion illustrates the possibility of information sharing between suppliers. 3)If the penalty of order delay is high, the inventory of two parts should be prepared equal, otherwise, the inventory of two parts should be prepared unequal. Hence, whether a decentralized system should be altered for Symmetric system or unsymmetrical system , it depends.
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