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风险规避下具有促销效应的收益共享契约
Revenue sharing contract for a risk-averse supply chain with promotional effect
摘要点击 3664  全文点击 62  投稿时间:2012-03-22  修订日期:2012-12-16
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中文关键词  收益共享契约;促销努力;风险规避;CVaR
英文关键词   revenue sharing contract; promotional effect; risk aversion; CVaR
基金项目  国家自然科学基金资助项目 (71102178);国家社会科学基金重点资助项目(08AJY028);中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(No.CDJSK10 02 01)
学科分类代码  630.5025
作者单位E-mail
代建生 重庆大学 jiansheng.dai@163.com 
孟卫东 重庆大学  
中文摘要
      在CVaR风险度量准则下,考察了销售商风险规避且存在促销效应下的收益共享契约,并从中获得一些管理启示。讨论了风险规避销售商的最优订购和促销努力决策。探讨了传统收益共享契约和改进收益共享契约的协调问题,分析了契约参数之间的关系,得到以下结论:在改进收益共享契约下,给定批发价格,销售商越规避风险,其收益共享比例和成本分担比例就越大。最后考察了促销努力效应和风险规避偏好对收益共享契约可行域的影响,指出促销效应和风险规避缩小了契约可行域,引入成本分担机制有助于消除促销效应对契约可行域的影响。
英文摘要
      Based on CVaR risk measure criterion, this paper investigates revenue sharing contract (RSC) for a supply chain with a risk-averse retailer and sales effort effect, from which some managerial insights are developed. It discusses the retailer’s optimal ordering and promotional effort decision. It explores channel coordination issue via a conventional RSC and improved RSC, and analyses relationships of contract parameters. It concludes that when wholesale price is given, the more risk-averse the retailer is, the bigger the ratios of its revenue-sharing and cost-sharing are, under improved RSC. Finally, it investigates impact of the retailer’s promotional effort and risk aversion on feasible domain of RSCs, and points out that both sales effect and risk aversion reduce feasible range of the efficient contracts, and introduction of cost-sharing mechanism helps eliminate adverse impact of promotional effect on the contract feasible region.
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