This study investigates a dedication timing game and provides theoretical predictions, experimental designs, and empirical analysis for the dilemma of public goods provision with the nature of timing that prevails in reality. The results show that individuals’ dedication behavior is significantly affected by the information environment. Compared with the imperfect information environment where the timing information of the public goods activity cannot be observed, the expected initiation time of the activity and the expected participation time of the group members are both earlier when the information can be observed perfectly in real-time, yet the probability of the public goods provision is lower. Overall, higher social welfare is achieved in the perfect information environment than in the imperfect information environment. This study not only lends theoretical support and empirical evidence for the above results, but also reveals the important role of the information environment on policy targets: Policies aimed at promoting the universality of public goods provision should prevent information diffusion, while those aimed at improving the timeliness of public goods provision should encourage an open and transparent information environment.