本文精选了会计学国际顶刊《Journal of Accounting Research》近期发表的论文,提供会计学研究领域最新的学术动态。
Facilitating Tacit Collusion Through Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from Common Ownership
原刊和作者:
Journal of Accounting Research Volume 60 Issue 5
ANDREA PAWLICZEK (University of Colorado)
A. NICOLE SKINNER (University of Georgia)
SARAH L. C. ZECHMAN (University of Colorado)
Abstract
We examine whether voluntary disclosure is associated with incentives for firms to collude. Public disclosure can facilitate collusion by aiding with coordination and monitoring for defections. Using common ownership (investors holding stock in competing firms) to identify reduced incentives to compete, we find a positive association between public disclosure and these incentives. We also find that common ownership is positively associated with measures of disclosure that are likely to facilitate tacit collusion and that this association is stronger in industries where collusion is easier. Our study expands the literature on disclosure and competition among firms by showing that public disclosure is positively associated with incentives for tacit collusion. This finding is consistent with managers facilitating anticompetitive outcomes using voluntary disclosure.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12452
The Roles of Data Providers and Analysts in the Production, Dissemination, and Pricing of Street Earnings
原刊和作者:
Journal of Accounting Research Volume 60 Issue 5
KHRYSTYNA BOCHKAY (University of Miami)
STAN MARKOV (University of Texas at Dallas)
MUSA SUBASI (University of Maryland)
ERIC WEISBROD (University of Kansas)
Abstract
In September 2009, Thomson Reuters (TR) discontinued its practice of relying on analysts to determine the treatment of unexpected charges and gains in favor of their immediate exclusion from GAAP earnings. Adopting a difference-in-differences approach, we show that this plausibly exogenous change in TR's methodology resulted in street earnings that are more predictive of future performance; and timelier, more accurate, and less dispersed analyst forecasts of future earnings, consistent with TR enhancing the properties of street earnings and analyst forecasts. Finally, using path analysis we show that a significant portion of TR's effect on price discovery is through its effect on analysts; and that the change in TR's treatment of unexpected items increased (decreased) the relative influence of TR (analysts) on the pricing of street earnings. We conclude that forecast data providers like TR are more than a conduit of information from analysts to investors.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12457
Do Borrowers Intentionally Avoid Covenant Violations? A Reexamination of the Debt Covenant Hypothesis
原刊和作者:
Journal of Accounting Research Volume 60 Issue 5
ADAM BORDEMAN (Cal Poly San Luis Obispo)
PETER DEMERJIAN (Georgia State University)
Abstract
In this study, we replicate and extend the Dichev and Skinner [DS: 2002] study on the debt covenant hypothesis (DCH). We start by replicating DS and find results consistent with theirs. We then extend their work by changing three aspects of the research design: histogram bin width, calculation of slack, and statistical test of discontinuity. We find that the inference from DS is generally robust to varying these choices, although sensitive to different bin widths, during their sample period. We extend our analysis to the period 2000–2019 and find that support for DCH remains robust. We do, however, find a lack of support for DCH when examining the most common financial covenant, debt-to-EBITDA. These findings suggest a more nuanced perspective on DCH, whereby different types of financial covenants provide different incentives and abilities to avoid technical default.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12456
How Do Disclosure Repetition and Interactivity Influence Investors’ Judgments?
原刊和作者:
Journal of Accounting Research Volume 60 Issue 5
NERISSA C. BROWN (University of Illinois)
BRIAN T. GALE (University of Washington)
STEPHANIE M. GRANT (University of Washington)
Abstract
Recent regulatory amendments aimed at modernizing disclosures and enhancing their usefulness focus on repetition and interactivity within firms’ disclosure filings. We use two experiments to provide evidence on the effects of disclosure repetition (repeating of information in the filing) and disclosure interactivity (user involvement in directing the form or content of the information displayed) on investors’ information processing and investment judgments. Results show that repetition increases investors’ processing of repeated information, consistent with the informational role of repetition documented in prior research. In contrast, repetition reduces investors’ processing of other, nonrepeated information when the filing is less interactive. This evidence corroborates concerns that repetition can obscure value-relevant information from investors. However, we find that more interactive disclosures mitigate this harmful effect of repetition on investors’ processing of nonrepeated information. Further, more interactive disclosures lead to deeper overall processing of both repeated and nonrepeated information, rather than more interactive disclosures redirecting investors’ attention and processing away from repeated information. Thus, our evidence suggests that disclosure interactivity is an important disclosure attribute that counteracts the potentially harmful effects of repetition on investors' processing of nonrepeated information, while preserving repetition's informational role.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12420
The Costs of Waiving Audit Adjustments
Journal of Accounting Research Volume 60 Issue 5
PREETI CHOUDHARY (University of Arizona)
KENNETH MERKLEY (Indiana University)
KATHERINE SCHIPPER (Duke University)
Abstract
We analyze the disposition of auditor-proposed adjustments to financial statements. Our analyses address concerns, expressed by regulators and others, that auditors and their clients fixate on quantitative thresholds and overlook qualitative factors in assessing the materiality of discovered misstatements. Using a large sample of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)-inspected audits, we examine the frequency with which management records versus waives auditor-proposed adjustments and whether waiving-proposed adjustments ha consequences for reporting reliability and the audit process. We find waived adjustments are linked to lower financial reporting quality measured by material misstatements, to incentives to meet/beat earnings targets, and to the audit process, as measured by higher next-period audit effort and fees and higher next-period proposed adjustments. These effects on the audit process are consistent with auditors responding to the increased risk associated with waived adjustments. In an exploratory analysis, we find that controlling for the amount of proposed adjustments, auditor resignations are negatively associated with waived adjustments.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12453