Technological mediation, mediating morality and moral imaginaries of design: Performance measurement systems in the pharmaceutical industry

原刊和作者：

Accounting, Organizations and Society Volume 112

Chiara Bottausci （University of Bristol Business School）

Keith Robson （HEC）

Claire Dambrin （ESCP Business School）

Abstract

In this paper, we seek to understand the ethics of accounting technology design. We commence by working with the concept of technological mediation, which is theorizing how technologies steer actions by evoking given behaviours and by contributing to perceptions and interpretations of reality that form the basis for choices and decisions to act. As such, this relation between people and technologies has important ethical consequences since it implies that technologies contribute actively to how humans do ethics. In this paper, we draw upon a postphenomenological approach (Ihde; Verbeek) to study and to theorise the moral mediations brought about by accounting technology, by examining how, in its design, technology can actively mediate the moral choices and guide the moral actions human beings make. Our central research question is ‘how is morality mediated in the design of accounting technologies?‘. This question is explored through an ethnographic study of the design of a new Performance Measurement and Compensation System in the Italian division of a multi-national pharmaceutical company. We offer two main contributions towards answering this question. First, by working within the theory of technological mediation, we develop the concept of a ‘moral imaginary’ as an approach to understanding designing the morality of things. Second, we elaborate a process model to theorise how moral mediations unfold in the design of accounting technology. From our conceptual motivation and the theoretical elaboration it inspired, we illuminate how the design of accounting technologies, in this case a PMS system, is a form of ‘engineering ethics’ through techno-moral mediation.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2023.101535

Costing system design and honesty in managerial reporting: An experimental examination of multi-agent budget and capacity reporting

原刊和作者：

Accounting, Organizations and Society Volume 112

Sophie Maussen （Ghent University）

Eddy Cardinaels （Tilburg University）

Sophie Hoozée （Ghent University）

Abstract

Time-Driven Activity-Based Costing (TDABC) systems use time inputs and distinguish between the cost of resource usage and the cost of unused capacity to provide accurate cost information. Importantly, TDABC produces aggregate signals of unused capacity at the department level, which offers the potential for superiors to assess misreporting or slack creation during budgeting without knowing which subordinates contributed to the slack. In a multi-agent participative budgeting experiment, we examine the impact of two capacity reporting conditions against a condition where capacity reporting is absent. When superiors receive an aggregate signal of unused capacity and subordinates have no discretion over cost allocation input parameters, misreporting of cost budgets decreases compared to when capacity reporting is absent. However, the benefits of capacity reporting on misreporting largely vanish when subordinates have discretion over the inputs allowing them to hide their unused capacity. When discretion is absent, subordinates anticipate peers to reduce misreporting to avoid the superior's rejection of their aggregate proposal. Yet, discretion over the inputs changes subordinates' anticipation in that they expect others to misreport and hide unused capacity to appear honest. Costing system designers should thus be aware that giving employees discretion over time inputs can offset the decision-making benefits of TDABC.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2024.101541

Quantitative technologies and reflexivity: The role of tools and their layouts in the case of credit risk management

原刊和作者：

Accounting, Organizations and Society Volume 112

Céline Baud （Université Paris-Dauphine）

Nathalie Lallemand-Stempak （IAE Paris - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne）

Abstract

The development of quantitative technologies is increasingly challenging professional practices and raises questions about whether and how organizations may foster plural and reflexive practices. In this paper, we outline the role played by tools and their layouts in this process. Tools can sustain the enactment of plural views, logics and evaluative principles. However, it is not clear why, in some cases, designing or using these tools triggers intractable conflicts instead of helping to sustain reflexivity in a “productive” way. To address this issue, we explore the case of a French bank that introduced in its credit management processes a new statistical approach of risk management, which conflicted with the professional approach that prevailed at the time. Relying on Boltanski’s (2011) work on critique, we highlight how “productive” reflexivity emerges, not only from critique, but from a dynamic relationship between critique, confirmation and practical action. This framework allows us to bring a fresh look at the layouts identified in the literature as able to sustain pluralism by exposing their differences regarding whether and how they may contribute to trigger reflexivity. We especially show that, when quantitative technologies are involved, the creation of compromising accounts may prompt dynamics of escalating conflict, while combinations may help organising a pluralism of modes of evaluation that nurtures reflexivity without inhibiting action. Moreover, our study shows how, in credit risk management, quantitative technologies can be implemented, even in the most operational processes, without bringing about an unreflexive “illusion” of control.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2023.101533

Transaction cost unbundling and investors’ reliance on investment research: Evidence from experimental asset markets

原刊和作者：

Accounting, Organizations and Society Volume 112

Sebastian Stirnkorb （University of Amsterdam）

Abstract

Broker-dealers traditionally charge their clients for the provision of investment research with a composite fee that bundles payments for research with other variable fees, such as those for trade executions. Due to regulatory changes in Europe, US broker-dealers temporarily allowed some of their clients to pay an explicit fee for the provision of investment research. Drawing on the sunk cost literature, I examine how transaction cost unbundling influences investors’ reliance on investment research. Results from 16 experimental markets indicate that investors place greater weight on costly forecasts under a system of unbundled payments compared to bundled payments, but only if transaction costs are sufficiently high, which is consistent with the dynamics of a sunk cost fallacy. I find marginal evidence that the enhanced focus on the forecast further inhibits investors' learning, as reflected in a slower reduction of price errors over time. These results are important since investors worldwide are increasingly paying explicit charges for investment research, a trend reinforced by a recent SEC policy change.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2024.101542

The effect of reward frequency on performance under cash rewards and tangible rewards

Accounting, Organizations and Society Volume 112

Andrew H. Newman （University of South Carolina）

Ivo D. Tafkov （Georgia State University）

Nathan J. Waddoups （University of Denver）

Xiaomei Grazia Xiong （Utah State University）

Abstract

Recent trends in incentive compensation highlight two important features regarding performance-based rewards: (a) firms are offering rewards more frequently, and (b) firms are increasingly using tangible rewards in lieu of cash rewards to motivate employees. This study investigates how reward frequency and reward type jointly influence employee performance. Drawing on both economic and behavioral theories, we predict and find that increasing reward frequency has a more positive effect on overall employee performance for cash rewards than for tangible rewards. We also predict and find that this overall effect stems from differential responses to increasing reward frequency over time as the performance effect grows over time for cash rewards while it remains relatively stable over time for tangible rewards. Results of our study contribute to both theory and practice by enhancing our understanding of the role reward frequency plays in motivating employee performance, and how its efficacy is affected by reward type.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2024.101543