本文精选了经济学国际顶刊《Econometrica》近期发表的论文，提供经济学研究领域最新的学术动态。

Attributes: Selective Learning and Influence

原刊和作者：

Econometrica Volume 92, Issue 2

Arjada Bardhi （New York University）

Abstract

An agent selectively samples attributes of a complex project so as to influence the decision of a principal. The players disagree about the weighting, or relevance, of attributes. The correlation across attributes is modeled through a Gaussian process, the covariance function of which captures pairwise attribute similarity. The key trade-off in sampling is between the alignment of the players' posterior values for the project and the variability of the principal's decision. Under a natural property of the attribute correlation—the nearest-attribute property (NAP)—each optimal attribute is relevant for some player and at most two optimal attributes are relevant for only one player. We derive comparative statics in the strength of attribute correlation and examine the robustness of our findings to violations of NAP for a tractable class of distance-based covariances. The findings carry testable implications for attribute-based product evaluation and strategic selection of pilot sites.

Link: https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA18355

Adapting to Climate Risk With Guaranteed Credit: Evidence From Bangladesh

原刊和作者：

Econometrica Volume 92, Issue 2

Gregory Lane （University of Chicago）

Abstract

Climate change is increasing the frequency of extreme weather events, with low-income countries being disproportionately impacted. However, these countries often face market frictions that hinder their ability to adopt effective adaptation strategies. In this paper, I explore the role of credit market failures in limiting adaptation. To achieve this, I collaborate with a large microfinance institution and offer a randomly selected group of farmers access to guaranteed credit through an “Emergency Loan” following a negative climate shock. I document three key results. First, farmers who have access to the emergency loan make less costly adaptation choices and are less severely affected when a flood occurs. Second, I find no evidence of adverse spillover effects on households that did not receive the Emergency Loan. Finally, I demonstrate that providing the Emergency Loan is profitable for the microfinance institution, making it a viable tool for the private sector to employ in similar circumstances.

Link: https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA19127

Flexible Moral Hazard Problems

原刊和作者：

Econometrica Volume 92, Issue 2

George Georgiadis （Northwestern University）

Doron Ravid （University of Chicago）

Balázs Szentes （HKU Business School）

Abstract

This paper considers a moral hazard problem where the agent can choose any output distribution with a support in a given compact set. The agent's effort-cost is smooth and increasing in first-order stochastic dominance. To analyze this model, we develop a generalized notion of the first-order approach applicable to optimization problems over measures. We demonstrate each output distribution can be implemented and identify those contracts that implement that distribution. These contracts are characterized by a simple first-order condition for each output that equates the agent's marginal cost of changing the implemented distribution around that output with its marginal benefit. Furthermore, the agent's wage is shown to be increasing in output. Finally, we consider the problem of a profit-maximizing principal and provide a first-order characterization of principal-optimal distributions.

Link: https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA21383

Bootstrap Inference for Fixed-Effect Models

原刊和作者：

Econometrica Volume 92, Issue 2

Ayden Higgins （University of Oxford）

Koen Jochmans （University of Toulouse Capitole）

Abstract

The maximum-likelihood estimator of nonlinear panel data models with fixed effects is asymptotically biased under rectangular-array asymptotics. The literature has devoted substantial effort to devising methods that correct for this bias as a means to salvage standard inferential procedures. The chief purpose of this paper is to show that the (recursive, parametric) bootstrap replicates the asymptotic distribution of the (uncorrected) maximum-likelihood estimator and of the likelihood-ratio statistic. This justifies the use of confidence sets and decision rules for hypothesis testing constructed via conventional bootstrap methods. No modification for the presence of bias needs to be made.

Link: https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20712

Bargaining and Exclusion With Multiple Buyers

Econometrica Volume 92, Issue 2

Dilip Abreu （New York University）

Mihai Manea （Stony Brook University）

Abstract

A seller trades with q out of n buyers who have valuations a1 ≥ a2 ≥ ? ≥ an > 0 via sequential bilateral bargaining. When q < n, buyer payoffs vary across equilibria in the patient limit, but seller payoffs do not, and converge to

If l* is the (generically unique) maximizer of this optimization problem, then each buyer i < l* trades with probability 1 at the fair price ai/2, while buyers i ≥ l* are excluded from trade with positive probability. Bargaining with buyers who face the threat of exclusion is driven by a sequential outside option principle: the seller can sequentially exercise the outside option of trading with the extra marginal buyer q   1, then with the new extra marginal buyer q, and so on, extracting full surplus from each buyer in this sequence and enhancing the outside option at every stage. A seller who can serve all buyers (q = n) may benefit from creating scarcity by committing to exclude some remaining buyers as negotiations proceed. An optimal exclusion commitment, within a general class, excludes a single buyer but maintains flexibility about which buyer is excluded. Results apply symmetrically to a buyer bargaining with multiple sellers.

Link: https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA19675