本文精选了经济学领域国际顶刊《The Review of Economic Studies》近期发表的论文，提供经济学领域最新的学术动态。

Labour Market Screening and the Design of Social Insurance: An Equilibrium Analysis of the Labour Market for the Disabled

原刊和作者：

The Review of Economic Studies Volume 92, Issue 1

Naoki Aizawa （University of Wisconsin-Madison）

Soojin Kim （Georgia State University）

Serena Rhee （Chung-Ang University）

Abstract

This article studies how firms’ screening incentives in the labour market affect the optimal design of social insurance programs and quantitatively assesses the U.S. disability policies accounting for firms’ screening of the disabled. We develop an equilibrium search model where workers with different productivities have heterogeneous preferences over non-wage benefits and firms cannot offer an employment contract that explicitly depends on worker types. In this environment, firms may use contracts to screen out a certain type of workers, distorting employment rates and contracts in equilibrium. Therefore, the optimal structure of social insurance policies depends on firms’ screening incentives. We extend and structurally estimate this framework to quantitatively understand the inefficiencies arising from firms’ incentives to screen out disabled workers and examine the optimal joint design of disability insurance (DI) and various forms of firm subsidies. We find that hiring subsidies mitigate screening distortions; at the same time, they interact with DI by reducing the labour supply disincentives it generates. The optimal policy structure leads to a considerable welfare gain by simultaneously making firm subsidies and DI benefits more generous.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdae015

Optimal Allocation via Waitlists: Simplicity Through Information Design

原刊和作者：

The Review of Economic Studies Volume 92, Issue 1

Itai Ashlagi （Stanford University）

Faidra Monachou （Yale University）

Afshin Nikzad （University of Southern California）

Abstract

We study non-monetary markets where objects that arrive over time are allocated to unit-demand agents with private types, such as in the allocation of public housing or deceased-donor organs. An agent’s value for an object is supermodular in her type and the object quality, and her payoff is her value minus her waiting cost. The social planner’s objective is a weighted sum of allocative efficiency (i.e. the sum of values) and welfare (i.e. the sum of payoffs). We identify optimal mechanisms in the class of direct-revelation mechanisms. When the social planner can design the information disclosed to the agents about the objects, the optimal mechanism has a simple implementation: a first-come first-served waitlist with deferrals. In this implementation, the object qualities are partitioned into intervals; only the interval containing the object quality is disclosed to agents. When the planner places a higher weight on welfare, optimal disclosure policies become coarser.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdae013

Inefficient Automation

原刊和作者：

The Review of Economic Studies Volume 92, Issue 1

Martin Beraja （MIT）

Nathan Zorzi （Dartmouth College）

Abstract

How should the government respond to automation? We study this question in a heterogeneous agent model that takes worker displacement seriously. We recognize that displaced workers face two frictions in practice: reallocation is slow and borrowing is limited. We analyze a second best problem where the government can tax automation but lacks redistributive tools to fully alleviate borrowing frictions. The equilibrium is (constrained) inefficient and automation is excessive. Firms do not internalize that automation depresses the income of automated workers early on during the transition, precisely when they become borrowing constrained. The government finds it optimal to slow down automation on efficiency grounds, even when it does not value equity. Quantitatively, the optimal speed of automation is considerably lower than at the laissez-faire. The optimal policy improves efficiency and delivers meaningful welfare gains.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdae019

Migration and the Value of Social Networks

原刊和作者：

The Review of Economic Studies Volume 92, Issue 1

Joshua E Blumenstock （University of California）

Guanghua Chi （University of California）

Xu Tan （University of Washington）

Abstract

How do social networks influence the decision to migrate? Prior work suggests two distinct mechanisms that have historically been difficult to differentiate: as a conduit of information, and as a source of social and economic support. We disentangle these mechanisms using a massive “digital trace” dataset that allows us to observe the migration decisions made by millions of individuals over several years, as well as the complete social network of each person in the months before and after migration. These data allow us to establish a new set of stylized facts about the relationship between social networks and migration. Our main analysis indicates that the average migrant derives more social capital from “interconnected” networks that provide social support than from “extensive” networks that efficiently transmit information.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad113

Private Sector Provision as an “Escape Valve”: The Mexico Diabetes Experiment

The Review of Economic Studies Volume 92, Issue 1

Ari Bronsoler （Google）

Jonathan Gruber （Massachusetts Institute of Technology）

Enrique Seira （Michigan State University）

Abstract

Public health systems are dominant in much of the world but often face fiscal constraints that lead to rationing of care. As a result, private sector healthcare providers could in theory beneficially supplement public systems, but evaluating the benefits of private alternatives has been challenging. We evaluate a private supplement to the free public health system for one of the world’s deadliest health problems, diabetes. We estimate enormous impacts of the private supplement, increasing the share of those treated who are under control by 69%. This effect arises through both improved treatment compliance and health behavior. We find diabetes complications fall in the short run, and that the net costs of this intervention are one-third of the gross costs. The returns to private care do not appear to reflect more productive delivery but rather more attachment to medical care, offering lessons for improving the public system.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdae024