国家自然科学基金资助项目(71972182; 71573281; 71802076); 湖南省自然科学青年基金资助项目(2019JJ50070); 中南大学创新驱动项目(2020CX050)
This paper studies a supply chain with one supplier and one buyer and explores the effects of inspection mechanism，traceability mechanism，and combination mechanism (sampling inspection and traceability) on product quality control based on newsvendor model considering quality uncertainty and inspection error in both the decentralized and centralized supply chain. It is found that when quality uncertainty is high，the traceability mechanism is more beneficial to retailers in both types of supply chains; however，with the improvement of product quality，the combination mechanism becomes better than the other two mechanisms in the decentralized supply chain，while the inspection mechanism is better in the centralized supply chain. It is also found that inspection accuracy，traceability cost，and responsibility cost will not affect the trend of the retailer’s profit as the defective rate changes and have little effect on the retailer’s selection of the quality control mechanism. When the defective rate is low，increasing the threshold of the defective rate of the directly-acceptance strategy may increase the retailer’s profit whereas increasing the threshold of the defective rate of the acceptance and traceability strategy will decrease the retailer’s profit; but when the defective rate is high，the conclusion is the opposite.