This article investigates supply chain coordination with promotional effort and risk aversion via buyback contracts under the CVaＲ decision criterion． It explores the impact of the retailer’s promotional effort and risk aversion on its optimal order quantity，and shows that an increased promotional effort or a decreased risk aversion leads to a higher order quantity． Two types of buy-back contracts improved are designed to coordinate the supply chain under two different scenarios． In one case，the buy-back contracts combined with costsharing mechanism can coordinate the supply chain with a not-too-risk-averse retailer． In the other case，however， to achieve channel coordination when the retailer is excessively risk averse，it must impose some restric-tions on the repurchase quantity and price: To buy back such a quantity that is not more than the difference between the quantity sold and the optimum order quantity，and to let the buy-back price be not less than the wholesale price． At last，it discusses the application of the two types of contracts for the sake of the supplier，and analyzes the impact of the retailer’s risk aversion on the buy-back price．