南北碳排放配额政策博弈分析与策略选择
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杨仕辉( 1965—) ,男,江西丰城人,博士,研究员,教授,博士生导师. Email: yangshh@126.com

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国家自然科学基金资助项目(71273114) .


Game analysis and strategy choices of north-south carbom emission quota policies
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    摘要:

    在回顾碳减排政策演变的基础上,基于双变量( 贸易比较优势和环境比较优势) 、碳排放配额政策和不完全市场竞争假设,构建了两阶段的政府碳排放配额政策与企业碳减排水平选择的博弈模型,应用逆向求解法得到了均衡解; 进而考虑激励相容条件和参与约束条件,得到全局稳定均衡最优解及其条件,从福利、贸易、环境效应等多个角度分析比较了南北国家碳排放许可证政策、碳排放配额许可交易政策和许可交易碳排放权合作政策的选择条件. 结果表明: 从改善福利来看,碳排放配额许可交易市场能够促进资源在国家间的有效配置、实现Pareto改进; 从改善环境来看,许可交易碳排放权合作政策最好,碳排放许可证政策最差; 从改善贸易来看,三种政策难分伯仲,但许可交易碳排放权合作政策更有利于北方国家,碳排放配额许可交易政策更有利于南方国家. 三种政策均不可能实现环境和贸易同时改善,短期内南方国家仍会优先选择碳排放配额许可交易政策,发达国家试图短期内实现全球环境政策合作还不够现实,应本着更为务实的原则积极稳妥、循序渐进的方式来推进环境合作.

    Abstract:

    By reviewing the evolution of carbon emission abatement policies,this paper presents a two-stage game for the interaction between government carbon emission permits policies and firms’abatement level and obtains the equilibrium solution,which is based on the assumptions among double variables( trade comparative advantage and environment comparative advantage) ,carbon emission quota policies and imperfectly competitive conditions. Using the way of backward induction,we first obtain the equilibrium solution and then get the optimal general steady equilibrium solution considering both the incentive compatibility constraint and the individual rationality constraint. This paper analyses,compares and derives the conditions of policy choices,from the angles of welfare effect,trade effect and environment effect,among the three different permits policies of North-South country ( named non-tradable carbon permits policy,tradable carbon permits policy,and cooperative and tradable carbon permits policy respectively) . The results show that: From the view of welfare improvement,the permits market would promote effective allocation of resources and leads to a Pareto improvement.In terms of environment improvement,environment effect weights most with cooperative and tradable carbon permits policy,least with non-tradable carbon permits policy. When considering trade improvement,the three policies are equally prosperous,except that the cooperative and tradable permits policy is more favorable for the north while tradable permits are preferred by the south. All the three policies could not fulfill environment and trade improvement at the same time. Thus,in the short term,the south will give preference to the tradable permits policy. It’s unpractical for developed countries to achieve global environmental cooperation in a short time. Following a more pragmatic principle and taking the active and steady way,realizing cooperation step by step is a better choice for developed country.

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杨仕辉,魏守道,翁蔚哲.南北碳排放配额政策博弈分析与策略选择[J].管理科学学报,2016,19(1):12~23

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  • 在线发布日期: 2018-04-22
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