Incentive mechanism for venture investment when venture entrepreneurs have fairness preferences-from explicit efforts and implicit efforts perspectives
In this paper,the entrepreneur efforts are divided into explicit efforts and implicit efforts. According to the different types of efforts,a principal-agent model with rational venture investment is established.The fairness preference of behavioral economics is embedded into the venture investment’s incentive model,which is studied in different situations. Results showed that: If the venture entrepreneur has explicit efforts,the fairness preference coefficient will have no influence on the incentive coefficient,the venture entrepreneur’s effort level and venture capitalist’s effort level. If the venture entrepreneur’s efforts are implicit,the venture capitalists should share the project income with the venture entrepreneur ( the venture entrepreneur’s incentive coefficient is greater than 0) . Moreover,if the venture entrepreneur has fairness preferences,the project’s revenue sharing coefficient is greater than the project profit’s sharing coefficient; the venture entrepreneur and venture capitalists will both reduce the effort level; however,the venture entrepreneur’s actual profits are the highest. At the same time,the larger the venture entrepreneur’s fairness preference jealousy coefficient is,the more the actual profits are obtained. But the actual profit of the venture capitalists is negatively related to the fairness preference jealousy coefficient. Finally,with a simulation,the results of theoretical solution are further tested and analyzed,and the same conclusions are reached.