考虑竞争者进入威胁的易逝品动态定价机制
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张新鑫(1980—) ,女,河北邯郸人,博士,讲师. Email:zhangxxnk@ 163. com

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国家社会科学基金青年基金资助项目(13CGL058) ; 中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2014M551025) ; 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(11YJC630174) ; 天津市宣传文化“五个一批”人才培养工程资助项目(2015CR05)


Dynamic pricing for perishable product considering the threat of entry and consumer behaviors
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    摘要:

    本文研究了同时考虑竞争者进入威胁和消费者行为的易逝品的动态定价机制。依据策略性和忠诚性两个维度,将市场中的消费者分为策略型忠诚者、策略型转换者、短视型忠诚者和短视型转换者四种类型。建立了在位企业、竞争企业与策略消费者间的两阶段动态博弈模型,通过均衡求解与分析,探讨了在位企业和竞争企业的最优价格机制以及消费者行为对企业定价行为和均衡收益的影响,深入分析了竞争者的进入行为对在位企业定价和收益的影响,以及消费者策略行为和转换行为与竞争者进入行为间的交互作用机制。研究表明:在位企业可以依据策略消费者的比例,采取智能的动态定价机制,实行或放弃对策略消费者的跨期价格歧视,最大化自身收益;消费者策略行为会降低在位企业的绩效却能够提高竞争者的绩效;竞争者的进入并非总是对在位企业不利,在一定条件下,竞争者的进入有利于提高在位企业的绩效;在位企业通过多种方式培养自己的忠实顾客,不仅能够应对竞争者的进入威胁而且能够缓解消费者策略行为的负面影响。

    Abstract:

    This paper investigates dynamic pricing mechanisms of perishable products considering simultaneously consumer behaviors and the threat of entrant. According to dimensions of strategic behavior and loyal behavior, consumers in the market are divided into four types: strategic loyal consumers, strategic switchers, myopic loyal consumers and myopic switchers. A two period dynamic game is proposed among the incumbent firm, the potential entrant and strategic consumers. By an equilibrium analysis, the optimal pricing mechanisms of the incumbent and the entrant as well as the impacts of consumer behaviors on the equilibrium pricing strategies and revenues of the two firms are discussed. By an numerical study, the impact of the competitor’s entry on the pricing strategies and the revenue of the incumbent, and the interactive mechanism between strategic consumer behavior and store-switching behavior and the entry of the competitors are analyzed. The main results are: Firstly, the incumbent can adopt a smart dynamic pricing mechanism to hold or give up the opportunity to inter-temporary price-discrimination of strategic consumers to maximize his profit. In addition, strategic consumer behaviors may harm the performance of the incumbent but improve the performance of the entrant. Finally, the competitor’s entry does not necessarily result in negative impacts on the incumbent. In some conditions his entry may improve his performance by enlarging the market coverage effect. In a word, the incumbent should make efforts to culture his own loyal consumers through all measures such as a good CRM, and other promotion strategies, which not only help him to beat the threat of the entrant but to reduce the negative influence from the strategic consumer behaviors.

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张新鑫,申成霖,侯文华.考虑竞争者进入威胁的易逝品动态定价机制[J].管理科学学报,2016,19(10):34~47

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  • 在线发布日期: 2018-04-12
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