考虑专利许可及政府规制的再制造博弈
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F402

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国家自然科学基金资助项目(71874159; 71371169); 浙江省自然科学基金资助项目(LY18G020020)


Remanufacturing game with patent protection and government regulation
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    摘要:

    在第三方再制造商参与废旧产品的回收再制造活动时,往往会涉及专利许可与政府规制问题.构建了制造商与再制造商之间的动态博弈模型,分别探讨了无专利许可无政府规制、有专利许可无政府规制、有专利许可有政府规制3种模式下企业的生产决策和再制造绩效水平.研究发现,以制造商主导的专利许可机制对再制造活动具有一定的抑制作用,仅当再制造产业发展较为成熟时才能为制造商带来显著收益;以政府主导的生产者责任延伸制度有利于促进再制造产业发展,尤其在再制造业发展初期可有效提升产品回收再制造率,并且该制度对再制造的促进作用与再制造带来的环境效益呈正相关.研究结论对专利产品再制造过程中各企业的生产策略选择以及政府在再制造产业发展各阶段中财政政策的制定具有一定的参考价值.

    Abstract:

    Patent protection and government regulation are studied in the process of end-of-life ( EOL) product collection and remanufacturing operations undertaken by the third-party remanufacturer. Dynamic game models between manufacturers and remanufacturers are established for three scenarios to discuss respective production decision-makings of enterprises and remanufacturing performances: no patent protection without government regulation,patent protection without government regulation,and patent protection with government regulation. The results indicate that the manufacturer-led patent licensing mechanism restrains remanufacturing to some extent and can bring significant benefits to the manufacturers only when the remanufacturing industry is relatively well developed. The government-led extended producer responsibility (EPR) mechanism can facilitate the development of remanufacturing industry,by effectively enhancing the product recovery rate,especially during the early development periods of remanufacturing. In addition,the promoting effect of the governmentled mechanism on remanufacturing implementations is positively related to the environmental benefits brought about by remanufacturing. The conclusions are of significant references for remanufacturing-related enterprises in developing production strategies concerning remanufacturing patented products and for the government in developing related fiscal policies.

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曹柬,赵韵雯,吴思思,张雪梅,周根贵.考虑专利许可及政府规制的再制造博弈[J].管理科学学报,2020,23(3):1~23

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  • 在线发布日期: 2021-10-25
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