信息不对称下医药营销服务外包契约设计
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F224

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国家自然科学基金资助项目(71571141)


Design of contracts for pharmaceutical marketing service outsourcing withasymmetric information
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    摘要:

    为了缩减销售成本,一些制药企业将营销服务外包给合约销售公司(contract sales organization,CSO).由于CSO的营销努力不可合同化,制药企业需要基于市场销量来激励CSO的营销努力.然而,市场销量受制药企业定价决策的影响,因此CSO将面临制药企业提高定价的道德风险.此外,药品营销难度信息可能是CSO的私人信息,这使得制药企业面临逆向选择问题.当制药企业将营销服务外包给多个CSO时,由于制药企业针对同一药品在不同市场的售价相同,其定价决策对多个CSO所服务市场的销量具有共同的影响.相对绩效的激励契约能够消除共同不确定因素对代理人产出的影响,从而更有利于激励代理人付出高水平的努力.因此依据信息甄别的博弈模型,分析基于个体绩效与基于相对绩效的激励契约的有效性.研究发现:1)药品营销难度信息对称时,基于相对绩效的激励契约占优于基于个体绩效的激励契约,且可以获得全局最优的营销努力和期望利润;2)药品营销难度信息不对称时,两种激励契约均不能获得全局最优的营销努力和期望利润.数值分析表明,药品营销难度的先验概率,市场价格敏感性和高低类型药品营销难度差异的变化会影响制药企业的契约选择,较高的市场价格敏感性和较低的高低类型药品营销难度差异使得基于相对绩效的激励契约更有效.

    Abstract:

    In order to reduce the marketing cost,some pharmaceutical firms outsource their marketing services to CSO (contract sales organization) . The pharmaceutical firm pays CSO based on sales volume to incentivize its non-contractible marketing effort. However,the sales volume is affected by the pricing decision of the pharmaceutical firm,which makes CSO face the moral hazard of increasing price by the pharmaceutical firm. In addition,the pharmaceutical marketing difficulty may be the private information of the CSO,which will lead to adverse selection. When the pharmaceutical firm outsources marketing business to multiple CSOs,the pricing decision of the pharmaceutical firm has a common impact on the sales volume of the CSOs as the sales price is the same in different markets. The incentive contract based on relative performance can filter out the common shock effect on the output of agents,thereby effectively motivating the agents. The different effectiveness between incentive contracts based on relative and absolute performance is compared. It is shown that the incentive contract based on relative performance dominates the contract based on absolute performance when the pharmaceutical marketing difficulty is symmetrical information. Moreover,the incentive contract based on relative performance can achieve the first-best marketing effort and profit. Further,neither incentive contract can obtain the first-best marketing effort and profit when the pharmaceutical marketing difficulty is asymmetrical information. The numerical analysis further shows that a higher market price sensitivity or a lower difference between the high-type and low-type pharmaceutical marketing difficulty is more beneficial to the incentive contract based on relative performance.

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高杰,樊慧荣,李萧萧.信息不对称下医药营销服务外包契约设计[J].管理科学学报,2020,23(8):109~126

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  • 在线发布日期: 2021-10-25
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