后发国最优动态知识产权保护策略 — 一个统一的理论和经验分析
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1.河南科技大学商学院;2.南开大学经济学院;3.中国特色社会主义经济建设协同创新中心

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Latecomer countries’ optimal dynamic intellectual property rights protection strategies — a unified theoretical and empirical analysis
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1.Henan University of Science and Technology;2.School of Economics, Nankai University;3.The Laboratory for Economic Behaviors and Policy Simulation,Nankai University

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    摘要:

    基于种类扩张模型,本文将知识产权保护、前沿技术差距和技术追赶统一于一个一般均衡分析框架中研究后发国知识产权保护与该国技术进步之间的动态影响机制。研究表明,自主创新和技术模仿产生的技术追赶效应会随着前沿技术差距动态变化,致使知识产权保护对技术追赶的影响关于技术差距存在“门槛效应”。该“门槛效应”合理解释了国别层面上知识产权保护促进和抑制技术进步同时并存的悖论和发达国家在不同历史时期存在知识产权保护政策的时间不一致性悖论,并且国家基础创新转化能力与国家技术引进吸收能力会显著影响该门槛值。数值模拟显示:恒定低水平的知识产权保护会使技术后发国落入“技术追赶陷阱”中。随着技术差距由远及近,先松后紧地逐步完善知识产权保护政策是最优动态技术追赶策略,有利于后发国摆脱“技术追赶陷阱”,完成技术追赶过程。运用跨国面板数据,采用门槛模型验证了存在门槛效应的结论,实证结果不受内生性问题和核心指标不同测度方法影响。本研究有助于中国因时制宜和因地制宜地制定最优动态知识产权保护政策,促进自主创新,推动经济高质量发展。

    Abstract:

    Based on the product type expansion model, this paper unifies intellectual property protection, technological gaps, and technological catch-up in a general equilibrium analysis framework to study the dynamic impact mechanism between the intellectual property protection of the developing country and the technological progress of the country. Studies shows that the technological catch-up effect produced by independent innovation and technological imitation will dynamically change with the frontier technology gap, resulting in the impact of intellectual property protection on technological catch-up. This "threshold effect" reasonably explains the paradox that intellectual property protection promotes and inhibits technological progress at the same time at the national level, and the paradox of the inconsistency of intellectual property protection policies in developed countries in different historical periods, and the country's basic innovation and transformation capabilities absorptive capacity with national technology introduction will significantly affect the threshold. Numerical simulations show that a constant low level of intellectual property protection can cause technology-developing countries to fall into the "technology catch-up trap", which helps explain the stagnation of technology in countries such as Brazil and the Philippines since 1980. As the technology gap goes from far to near, it is the best dynamic technology catch-up strategy to gradually loosen and then gradually tighten the IP protection policy, which will help the developing countries get rid of the "technology catch-up trap" and complete the technology catch-up process. Using transnational panel data, a threshold model was used to verify the conclusion that there is a threshold effect. The empirical results are not affected by endogenous problems and different measures of core indicators. This research will help China formulate the best dynamic intellectual property protection policies, promote independent innovation, and promote high-quality economic development.

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  • 收稿日期:2021-11-02
  • 最后修改日期:2024-08-11
  • 录用日期:2024-08-17
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