Although accurately assessing the impact of compensation regulation policies on corporate incentive mechanisms has important academic significance and policy value，due to data limitations and identification strategies，there are still many controversies and deficiencies in current research． This paper utilizes the exogenous shock of the Compensation Ｒeform Program to investigate the impact of compensation incentives on the risk-taking of central enterprises． The DID test based on the Compensation Reform Program in 2015 shows that the risk-taking level in the treatment group has significantly reduced after the policy compared with the control group． Additionally，the higher the promotion expectation of the executives，the smaller the degree of competition and the longer the control chain level，the less the negative impact． Further analyses reveal that the policy inhibits the high-risk investment and financing behavior． Specifically，the debt financing rate is lower; the innovation investment scale is larger，but the innovation output is lower． These results indicate that the effective incentive mechanism is the necessary condition to improve the risk-taking of central enterprises． Therefore，the research is helpful to deepen the dispute discussion of compensation system reform，and provide theoretical basis and policy reference for further promoting the reform of state-owned enterprises and improving the efficiency of state-owned enterprises．