人力资本、激励与有限合伙制
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Human capital,incentives and limited partnership
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    摘要:

    本研究基于私募基金中GP和LP的博弈视角,在合作博弈框架下,通过决策权归属对公司制和有限合伙制进行界定,引入GP能力参数,探讨了有限合伙制的优势和适用性问题,以及人力资本对企业组织形式和企业价值的影响机制.研究发现由于决策权由LP转移到GP,有限合伙制能够充分发挥人力资本作用,实现更高的人力资本激励和企业价值,但是决策权的转移会丧失LP在收益分配中的优势.只有当GP能力水平达到一定程度,使得有限合伙制下联盟总体价值的上升足以弥补收益占比下降的负面作用时,有限合伙制下GP和LP收益均会上升,有限合伙制占优于公司制,实现帕累托改进,从而解释了私募基金等人力资本密集型行业采用有限合伙制的原因.为更好地发挥私募基金支持实体经济作用,培养专业领域的高水平人才是私募基金健康可持续发展的关键,有助于形成人力资本提升和产业转型升级良性循环,提高人力资本在收益分配中的相对优势.

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    In the context of cooperative game between GP and LP in private equity funds,this paper defines the corporation and limited partnership through the ownership of decision rights,introduces the GP’s capability parameter,and discusses the advantages of limited partnership,as well as the role of human capital in the choice of enterprise organizational form. It finds that due to the decision rights transferring from LP to GP,limited partnership can achieve higher human capital incentive and enterprise value. However,the shift in decision rights will cause the LP to lose its advantages in income distribution. Only when the GP’s capability reaches a high level,will the income of both the GP and LP under a limited partnership be higher than under corporation,achieving Pareto improvement. This paper explains why limited partnerships are often adopted in human capital-intensive industries,such as private equity funds. To better support the real economy,cultivating high-quality GPs is the key to the healthy and sustainable development of private equity funds. This will help to form a virtuous circle of human capital promotion and industrial transformation and upgrading,thereby improving the comparative advantage of human capital in income distribution.

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倪宣明,邱语宁,赵慧敏.人力资本、激励与有限合伙制[J].管理科学学报,2024,(6):112~126

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  • 在线发布日期: 2024-07-28
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