双支柱调控与银行风险承担——微观机制及结构-时序异质性
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Twopillar regulation and bank risktaking: Micro mechanisms and crosssectionalandtime heterogeneity
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    摘要:

    双支柱政策是危机后金融稳定治理框架的顶层设计,深入考察其对银行风险承担的影响对于完善双支柱调控框架及防控银行业风险具有重大意义.本文分析了双支柱政策对银行风险承担的微观影响机制,在此基础上选取2007年—2020年中国262家银行的面板数据进行实证检验.研究表明:紧缩性货币政策与宏观审慎监管均能抑制银行风险;宽松货币政策对银行产生风险溢出,宏观审慎监管则能削弱这一风险溢出,由此发挥双支柱政策的协同治理效应.机制检验表明,宏观审慎监管通过减弱宽松货币政策对银行特许权价值的负向冲击及减弱银行顺周期杠杆,削弱了宽松货币政策的风险溢出,由此形成政策互补.在结构维度,同业关联对双支柱政策的协同治理效应具有非对称影响,其弱化了宏观审慎监管对宽松货币政策风险溢出的抑制作用,放大了宏观审慎监管对紧缩性货币政策风险治理效果的削弱作用.此外,双支柱政策对规模更大、非利息业务占比更低的银行具有更好的协同治理效应.在时间维度,利率市场化推进与货币政策不确定性上升对双支柱政策的协同治理效应分别具有积极与消极的影响.

    Abstract:

    Twopillar policies constitute a crucial part of the postcrisis financial stabilization framework. As regards ameliorating the twopillar regulatory framework and mitigating banking sector risks, it is crucial to examine the effect of twopillar policies on bank risktaking in a systematical way. Hence, this paper analyzes the transmission mechanism between the twopillar policies and bank risktaking from a micro perspective. Based on this, an empirical study is conducted using banklevel panel data from 262 commercial banks in China from 2007 to 2020, to test the effects. The findings are as follows: Contractionary monetary policy and macroprudential regulation both exert a marginal reducing effect on bank risktaking, while loose monetary policy exerts a risk spillover effect on banks, which can be mitigated by macroprudential regulation. Mechanism analysis shows that macroprudential regulation mitigates the spillover effect of monetary policy by alleviating the negative impact of lowinterest rate monetary policy on bank charter value and by attenuating the procyclical adjustment of bank leverage, thereby performing a coordinated riskabating effect. In terms of crosssectional dimension, interbank connection exerts an asymmetric influence on the coordination effect of twopillar policies on bank risktaking. In a monetaryeasing environment, an increase in the interbank connection level weakens the mitigating effect of macroprudential regulation on the risk spillover generated by loose monetary policy. In a monetarytightening environment, an increase in interbank connection level worsens the weakening effect of macroprudential regulation on the riskreducing effect of contractionary monetary policy. Besides, twopillar policies generate a better coordinated riskabating effect on larger banks or those with a lower proportion of noninterest rate revenue. In terms of the time dimension, interest rate marketization strengthens the coordinated riskabating effect of twopillar policies, while increased monetary policy uncertainty weakens that effect.

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顾海峰,于家珺.双支柱调控与银行风险承担——微观机制及结构-时序异质性[J].管理科学学报,2025,(3):116~147

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  • 在线发布日期: 2025-04-11
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