僵尸企业的债务转嫁:基于供应链视角
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Debt shifting of zombie firms: A supply chain perspective
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    摘要:

    以2015年供给侧结构性改革为政策背景,分析僵尸企业如何基于供应链转嫁债务.实证结果表明,供给侧结构性改革导致僵尸企业(尤其是国有企业)减少了“有息”的银行信贷融资,但同时增加了“无息”的商业信用融资,将债务通过供应链转嫁给非僵尸企业.这种债务转嫁导致在僵尸企业比较高的下游行业,供应商应收账款显著上升.僵尸企业对供应商的债务转嫁并不能由信贷二次分配机制解释,而是因其在商业信用均衡中有更强的议价能力和供应商对政策冲击的客户的风险分担.虽然供给侧结构性改革有效阻断了银行向僵尸企业的无效“输血”,缓解了僵尸企业对信贷资源的占用,但这导致了僵尸企业在供应链上的资金占用增加,挤出上游高效企业的投资,产生了负外部性.本文的结论为理解僵尸企业负外部性和供给侧结构性改革的效果提供了新视角.建议政府在处理僵尸企业和产能过剩企业债务的过程中,应防范僵尸企业通过供应链转嫁债务给供应商,以避免对正常企业的负面溢出.

    Abstract:

    This paper examines how zombie firms shift their debt within the supply chain, following the 2015 supply-side structural reform in China. Findings reveal that zombie firms, particularly state-owned ones, are decreasing their reliance on bank loans while increasing the use of trade credit, effectively passing their debt to non-zombie firms in the supply chain. This debt shifting leads to higher unpaid invoices for suppliers in industries with a high proportion of zombie customers. This phenomenon cannot be explained by credit redistribution, but rather by the stronger negotiation power of zombie firms and the willingness of suppliers to share risk due to policy shocks. While the supply-side reform curtails ineffective “blood transfusions” from banks to zombie firms, it leads to an increase in the occupation of funds in the supply chain by zombie firms, thereby squeezing out investments from upstream efficient firms. These findings provide new insights into the impacts of zombie firms and the effects of the supply-side reform. It is suggested that the government should prevent zombie firms from shifting their debt to suppliers, thereby shielding healthy firms from harmful spillover effects.

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王义中,吕琳颖.僵尸企业的债务转嫁:基于供应链视角[J].管理科学学报,2025,(4):115~136

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  • 在线发布日期: 2025-05-08
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