知识经济时代的国企混改:股权策略及福利效应
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Mixed ownership reform in the knowledge economy era: Equity strategies and welfare effects
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    摘要:

    知识经济时代,通过民营企业的知识赋能提升国有企业竞争力是混合所有制改革的动机之一.本研究基于隐性知识分享视角,构建混合寡头竞争模型探究民营企业参与混改的最优股权结构及其福利效应.研究发现:激励民营企业分享隐性知识需使其参股比例高于特定阈值,“拉郎配”式混改无法提升社会福利.恰好激励隐性知识分享的参股比例为混改的最优股权结构,在该股权结构下,当且仅当国有企业对隐性知识的吸收能力高于特定阈值,且隐性知识价值位于合理区间时,混改才能提升社会福利.进一步考虑显性知识转移、递增边际生产成本、异质产品竞争、国有资本多目标等因素发现,激励隐性知识分享的参股比例阈值结构与混改的社会福利变化情况保持稳健.同时发现,产业链纵向互补情形下民营企业具有内生知识分享激励,但合理的股权结构对社会福利依旧至关重要.最后,本研究还发现,当隐性知识价值为民营企业私有信息时,可通过合宜的合约设计进行甄别.本研究提供了知识经济时代混改策略的理论分析框架,丰富了中国特色企业理论,对提高国有企业市场化混改效率具有启示意义.

    Abstract:

    In the knowledge economy era, knowledge empowering matters for the competitiveness of SOE in the mixed ownership reform. Based on the perspective of tacit knowledge sharing, this paper builds a mixed oligopoly model to study the optimal mixed ownership structure and its impact on social welfare. We find that: First, the private enterprise has incentives to share tacit knowledge if and only if equity share acquired by it is larger than a certain threshold (hereafter called equity transfer threshold). Mixed ownership that without knowledge sharing cannot improve welfare. Second, the equity transfer threshold that exactly incentivizes knowledge sharing corresponds to the optimal ownership structure. At this optimal ownership structure, the social welfare can be improved if and only if the SOE’s absorptive capacity is higher than a certain threshold and the knowledge value lies in a reasonable range. Further analysis shows that equity transfer threshold that incentivizes knowledge sharing remains robust after we consider explicit knowledge transfer, increasing marginal cost, differentiated duopoly and the multitask of stateowner. Meanwhile, in the vertical industrial chain structure, the private firm has endogenous incentives to share tacit knowledge, but the ownership structure still matters for social welfare. Finally, if the knowledge value is the private enterprise’s private information, a feasible contract can be designed to screen the knowledge type. This study enriches the theory of mixedownership firm, provides analytical framework and guidance for the practice of mixedownership reform.

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赖烽辉,李善民,王大中,杨楠.知识经济时代的国企混改:股权策略及福利效应[J].管理科学学报,2025,(7):153~172

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  • 在线发布日期: 2025-07-19
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