“碳泡沫”、资产搁浅与碳减排路径——基于政策规制的视角
DOI:
作者:
作者单位:

作者简介:

通讯作者:

中图分类号:

基金项目:


“Carbon bubble”, stranded assets, and emission reduction path: A policy regulation perspective
Author:
Affiliation:

Fund Project:

  • 摘要
  • |
  • 图/表
  • |
  • 访问统计
  • |
  • 参考文献
  • |
  • 相似文献
  • |
  • 引证文献
  • |
  • 资源附件
  • |
  • 文章评论
    摘要:

    本研究基于环保政策背景下能源公司资产搁浅的现状,构建了包含异质性能源生产企业和化石能源资产积累决策机制的多部门动态一般均衡模型,讨论了不同环境政策对应的碳减排路径,以及政策规制下的减排对社会福利的影响.本研究发现,减排政策将导致能源企业化石能源储备资产价值下降,带来“碳泡沫”破裂以及化石能源资产的逐步搁浅,影响能源部门融资和生产,并最终造成总产出与总消费下降.相比金融政策和产业政策,采用税收政策进行减排带来的福利损失较小,而在税收政策中能源税能最大化降低扭曲,提升社会福利;在化石能源储备资产搁浅带来的“碳泡沫”方面,采用能源税减排导致的“碳泡沫”最小,而采用化石能源储备积累税带来的“碳泡沫”最大.

    Abstract:

    Based on the current situation of stranded assets faced by energy companies under the background of environmental protection policies, this paper constructs a multi-sector dynamic general equilibrium model including heterogeneous energy production firms and fossil fuel asset accumulation decisions. It discusses the carbon emission reduction paths corresponding to different environmental policies and the impact of emission reduction on social welfare under policy regulation. It is found that emission reduction policies lead to a decline in the value of fossil fuel reserves held by energy companies, resulting in the bursting of the “carbon bubble” and the gradual stranding of fossil fuel assets. This affects the financing and production of the energy sector, ultimately causing a decline in total output and consumption. Compared with financial policies and industrial policies, tax policies for emission reduction result in smaller welfare losses. Among different tax policies, energy taxes are the most effective in reducing distortions and improving social welfare. In terms of the “carbon bubble” caused by the stranding of fossil energy reserve assets, the “carbon bubble” caused by an energy tax is the smallest, while the “carbon bubble” caused by a fossil fuel reserve investment tax is the largest.

    参考文献
    相似文献
    引证文献
引用本文

孙浩宁,董丰,贾彦东.“碳泡沫”、资产搁浅与碳减排路径——基于政策规制的视角[J].管理科学学报,2025,(8):32~48

复制
分享
文章指标
  • 点击次数:
  • 下载次数:
  • HTML阅读次数:
  • 引用次数:
历史
  • 收稿日期:
  • 最后修改日期:
  • 录用日期:
  • 在线发布日期: 2025-09-23
  • 出版日期:
您是第位访问者
管理科学学报 ® 2025 版权所有
通讯地址:天津市南开区卫津路92号天津大学第25教学楼A座908室 邮编:300072
联系电话/传真:022-27403197 电子信箱:jmsc@tju.edu.cn