制造企业B2C共享业务拓展策略分析——共享运营效率视角
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B2C sharing business extensions of manufacturer: The perspective of the efficiency of sharing service operations
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    摘要:

    针对现有文献“缺乏显性模型化B2C共享服务的分时租赁服务特性”这一缺陷,本研究引入共享运营效率(即共享产品在服务消费者过程中的周转率),建立和求解了相应的两阶段博弈模型,其中,制造商在第一阶段选择运营策略(传统销售策略、内部B2C共享业务拓展策略或外部B2C共享业务拓展策略),第二阶段,制造商和(外部B2C共享业务拓展策略下的)第三方B2C共享平台在相应运营策略下决定具体的运营变量.基于模型子博弈精炼均衡,获得了如下主要结果. 1)制造商选择内部(外部)B2C共享业务拓展策略的必要条件是制造商(第三方B2C共享平台)的共享运营效率超过一定的临界水平,并且,在此条件下,当且仅当第三方共享平台的共享运营效率(相对于制造商的共享运营效率)充分高且制造商的共享运营效率不是非常高时,制造商选择外部B2C共享业务拓展策略,否则,选择内部B2C共享业务拓展策略;2)如果用共享运营效率和共享需求满足能力这两个维度来刻画第三方B2C共享平台的特征,不仅对任意给定的第三方B2C共享平台的共享需求满足能力约束,结果1)在性质上依然成立,而且在影响制造商在内外部B2C共享业务拓展策略选择的意义上,这两个维度之间存在替代关系;3)从利益相关者的角度,对于给定的制造商的共享运营效率,只有在充分高和充分低的第三方B2C共享平台共享运营效率下制造商的最优运营策略能够实现三赢(制造商、消费者和社会计划者),否则,要么消费者剩余受损,要么社会总福利受损.

    Abstract:

    Focusing on the defect that existing literature does not explicitly model B2C sharing businesses as time-sharing rentals, this paper introduces the concept of efficiency of sharing service operations (ESSO), which captures the turnover rate of the shared product in serving consumers. The paper then develops and solves a two-stage game-theoretic model in which a manufacturer chooses its operational strategies from the following three strategies: Traditional sale, internal B2C sharing business extension, and external B2C sharing business extension, in stage 1. In stage 2, the manufacturer and a third-party B2C sharing platform (when the external B2C sharing business extension is chosen) make their specific operational decisions. By solving for the subgame perfect equilibrium, the following main results are obtained. 1) The necessary condition under which the manufacturer chooses the internal (external) B2C sharing business extension is that the ESSO of the manufacturer (the third-party B2C sharing platform) goes beyond a threshold, and given that this necessary condition is satisfied, the manufacturer chooses the external B2C sharing business extension if and only if the ESSO of the third-party B2C sharing platform is high enough (relative to the ESSO of the manufacturer) and the manufacturer’s ESSO is not too high. Otherwise, the manufacture will choose the internal B2C sharing business extension. 2) If the third-party B2C sharing platform is characterized by its ESSO and its ability to meet sharing demand, Result 1) still holds qualitatively for any given level of the ability to meet sharing demand. Additionally, a substitutive relationship exists between these two dimensions regarding their impacts on the manufacturer’s choice of the internal B2C sharing business extension. 3) From stakeholders’ perspectives, for a given level of the manufacturer’s ESSO, the optimal choice of its operational strategy results in a win-win-win scenario for the manufacturer, consumers, and the social planner if and only if the ESSO of the third-party B2C sharing platform is either high enough or low enough. Otherwise, it leads to some loss in either consumer surplus or social welfare.

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倪得兵,樊昕,叶飞.制造企业B2C共享业务拓展策略分析——共享运营效率视角[J].管理科学学报,2025,(8):108~128

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  • 在线发布日期: 2025-09-23
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