本文精选了金融学国际顶刊《The Review of Financial Studies》近期发表的论文，提供金融学研究领域最新的学术动态。

The Rise of Finance Companies and FinTech Lenders in Small Business Lending

原刊和作者：

The Review of Financial Studies Volume 35 Issue 11

Manasa Gopal （Scheller College of Business）

Philipp Schnabl （NYU Stern）

Abstract

We document that finance companies and FinTech lenders increased lending to small businesses after the 2008 financial crisis. We show that most of the increase substituted for a reduction in bank lending. In counties in which banks had a larger market share before the crisis, finance companies and FinTech lenders increased their lending more. We find no effect of reduced bank lending on employment, wages, and new business creation by 2016. Our results suggest that finance companies and FinTech lenders are major suppliers of credit to small businesses and played an important role in the recovery from the 2008 financial crisis.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhac034

Why Do Firms Borrow Directly from Nonbanks?

原刊和作者：

The Review of Financial Studies Volume 35 Issue 11

Sergey Chernenko （Purdue University）

Isil Erel （Ohio State University）

Robert Prilmeier （Tulane University）

Abstract

Analyzing hand-collected credit agreements for a sample of middle-market firms over 2010–2015, we find that one-third of all loans are directly extended by nonbank financial intermediaries. Two-thirds of such nonbank lending can be attributed to bank regulations that constrain banks’ ability to lend to unprofitable and highly levered borrowers. Firms with negative EBITDA and debt/EBITDA greater than six are 32% and 15% more likely to borrow from nonbanks. These firms pay significantly higher interest rates, especially following the 2013 leveraged loan guidance revisions. Nonbank borrowers also receive different nonprice terms compared to firms borrowing from banks.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhac016

Small Bank Lending in the Era of Fintech and Shadow Banks: A Sideshow?

原刊和作者：

The Review of Financial Studies Volume 35 Issue 11

Taylor A Begley （University of Kentucky）

Kandarp Srinivasan （D’Amore-McKim School of Business）

Abstract

Amid the emerging dominance of nonbanks, small banks use key financing advantages to persist in the mortgage market. We provide evidence of the heterogeneous impact of two shocks to the supply of mortgage credit: postcrisis regulatory burden and GSE financing cost changes. Small banks exploit regulation disproportionately affecting the largest four banks (Big4) and their ability to lend on balance sheet to strongly substitute for the retreating Big4. The erasure of guarantee fee (g-fee) discounts for large lenders facilitates small bank growth in GSE lending. Small banks also grow balance sheet loans in areas more exposed to g-fee hikes.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhac038

When FinTech Competes for Payment Flows

原刊和作者：

The Review of Financial Studies Volume 35 Issue 11

Christine A Parlour （Haas School of Business）

Uday Rajan （Stephen M. Ross School of Business）

Haoxiang Zhu （MIT Sloan School of Management）

Abstract

We study the impact of FinTech competition in payment services when a monopolist bank uses payment data to learn about consumers’ credit quality. Competition from FinTech payment providers disrupts this information spillover. The bank’s price for payment services and its loan offers are affected. FinTech competition promotes financial inclusion, may hurt consumers with a strong bank preference, and has an ambiguous effect on the loan market. Both FinTech data sales and consumer data portability increase bank lending, but the effects on consumer welfare are ambiguous. Under mild conditions, consumer welfare is higher under data sales than with data portability.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhac022

The Good, the Bad, and the Missed Boom

The Review of Financial Studies Volume 35 Issue 11

Enrico Perotti （University of Amsterdam）

Magdalena Rola-Janicka （Tilburg University）

Abstract

Some credit booms result in financial crises. While excessive risk-taking could plausibly explain the boom-to-bust cycle, many investors do not anticipate increasing risk. We show that credit booms may be misunderstood as being driven by high productivity because opaque bank assets disguise risk incentives. Balanced funding relative to productive prospects can sustain prudent lending (good boom), whereas funding imbalances may induce high risk exposure and boost asset prices (bad boom) or lead to asset underpricing and insufficient lending (missed boom). Rational agents drawing inference from prices make mistakes that can amplify the effect of funding imbalances and propagate risk.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhac014