本文精选了经济学国际顶刊《Econometrica》近期发表的论文,提供经济学研究领域最新的学术动态。
Dynamic Spatial General Equilibrium
原刊和作者:
Econometrica Volume91, Issue2
Benny Kleinman (Princeton University)
Ernest Liu (Princeton University)
Stephen J. Redding (Princeton University)
Abstract
We incorporate forward-looking capital accumulation into a dynamic discrete choice model of migration. We characterize the steady-state equilibrium; generalize existing dynamic exact-hat algebra techniques to incorporate investment; and linearize the model to provide an analytical characterization of the economy's transition path using spectral analysis. We show that capital and labor dynamics interact to shape the economy's speed of adjustment toward steady state. We implement our quantitative analysis using data on capital stocks, populations, and bilateral trade and migration flows for U.S. states from 1965–2015. We show that this interaction between capital and labor dynamics plays a central role in explaining the observed decline in the rate of income convergence across U.S. states and the persistent and heterogeneous impact of local shocks.
Link: https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20273
Synthetic Control as Online Linear Regression
原刊和作者:
Econometrica Volume91, Issue2
Jiafeng Chen (Harvard University)
Abstract
This paper notes a simple connection between synthetic control and online learning. Specifically, we recognize synthetic control as an instance of Follow-The-Leader (FTL). Standard results in online convex optimization then imply that, even when outcomes are chosen by an adversary, synthetic control predictions of counterfactual outcomes for the treated unit perform almost as well as an oracle weighted average of control units' outcomes. Synthetic control on differenced data performs almost as well as oracle weighted difference-in-differences, potentially making it an attractive choice in practice. We argue that this observation further supports the use of synthetic control estimators in comparative case studies.
Link: https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20720
Optimal Regulation of Noncompete Contracts
原刊和作者:
Econometrica Volume91, Issue2
Liyan Shi (Carnegie Mellon University)
Abstract
I study regulation of noncompete employment contracts, assessing the trade-off between restricting worker mobility and encouraging firm investment. I develop an on-the-job search model in which firms and workers sign dynamic wage contracts with noncompete clauses and firms invest in their workers' general human capital. Employers use noncompete clauses to enforce buyout payments when their workers depart, ultimately extracting rent from future employers. This rent extraction is socially excessive, and restrictions on these clauses can improve efficiency. The optimal regulation policy is characterized. In an application to the managerial labor market using a novel contract data set, I find the optimal policy to be quantitatively close to a ban.
Link: https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA18128
Bidding in Common-Value Auctions With an Unknown Number of Competitors
原刊和作者:
Econometrica Volume91, Issue2
Stephan Lauermann (University of Bonn)
Andre Speit (Private Sector)
Abstract
This paper studies a first-price common-value auction in which bidders do not know the number of their competitors. In contrast to the case of common-value auctions with a known number of rival bidders, the inference from winning is not monotone, and a “winner's blessing” emerges at low bids. As a result, bidding strategies may not be strictly increasing, but instead may contain atoms. Moreover, an equilibrium fails to exist when the expected number of competitors is large and the bid space is continuous. Therefore, we consider auctions on a grid. On a fine grid, high-signal bidders follow an essentially strictly increasing strategy, whereas low-signal bidders pool on two adjacent bids on the grid. The solutions of a “communication extension” based on Jackson, Simon, Swinkels, and Zame (2002) capture the equilibrium bidding behavior in the limit, as the grid becomes arbitrarily fine.
Link: https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA17793
Connecting to Power: Political Connections, Innovation, and Firm Dynamics
原刊和作者:
Econometrica Volume91, Issue2
Ufuk Akcigit (University of Chicago)
Salomé Baslandze (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta)
Francesca Lotti (Bank of Italy)
Abstract
How do political connections affect firm dynamics, innovation, and creative destruction? We extend a Schumpeterian growth model with political connections that help firms ease bureaucratic and regulatory burden. The model highlights how political connections influence an economy's business dynamism and innovation, and generates a number of implications guiding our empirical analysis. We construct a new large-scale data set for the period 1993–2014, on the universe of firms, workers, and politicians, complemented with corporate financial statements, patent data, and election data, so as to define connected firms as those employing local politicians. We identify a leadership paradox: market leaders are much more likely to be politically connected, but much less likely to innovate. Political connections relate to a higher rate of survival, as well as growth in employment and revenues, but not in productivity—a result that we also confirm using the regression discontinuity design. At the aggregate level, gains from political connections do not offset losses stemming from lower reallocation and growth.
Link: https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA18338