本文精选了金融学领域国际顶刊《The Review of Financial Studies》近期发表的论文,提供金融学研究领域最新的学术动态。
The Labor Market Effects of Loan Guarantee Programs
原刊和作者:
The Review of Financial Studies Volume 37, Issue 8
Jean-Noël Barrot (HEC Paris)
Thorsten Martin (Bocconi University)
Julien Sauvagnat (Bocconi University)
Boris Vallée (Harvard Business School)
Abstract
We investigate the labor market effects of a loan guarantee program targeting French SMEs during the financial crisis. Exploiting differences in regional treatment intensity in a border discontinuity design, we uncover a central trade-off for such interventions. While the program has a positive impact on workers’ employment and earnings trajectories that translates into positive aggregate employment effects, it dampens the worker reallocation toward more productive firms that happens following recessions, and particularly so for high-skill workers. This labor allocation effect is economically significant and translates into a reduction in aggregate productivity.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhae014
A Dynamic Theory of Lending Standards
原刊和作者:
The Review of Financial Studies Volume 37, Issue 8
Michael J Fishman (Northwestern University)
Jonathan A Parker (MIT)
Abstract
We analyze a dynamic credit market where banks choose lending standards, modeled as costly effort to screen out bad borrowers. Tighter standards worsen the borrower pool, increasing banks’ incentives to employ tight standards in the future. This dynamic complementarity in lending standards can amplify and prolong downturns, decreasing lending and increasing credit spreads. Because lending standards have negative externalities, the market can converge to a steady state with inefficiently tight lending standards. We discuss the role of optimal policy to avoid this outcome as well as the impact of balance sheet costs on lending standards.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhae022
The Dynamics of Loan Sales and Lender Incentives
原刊和作者:
The Review of Financial Studies Volume 37, Issue 8
Sebastian Gryglewicz (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
Simon Mayer (Carnegie Mellon University)
Erwan Morellec (CEPR)
Abstract
How much of a loan should a lender retain, and how do loan sales affect loan performance? We address these questions in a model in which a lender originates loans that it can sell to investors. The lender reduces default risk through screening at origination and monitoring after origination, but is subject to moral hazard. The optimal lender-investor contract can be implemented by requiring the lender to initially retain a share of the loan that it gradually sells to investors, rationalizing loan sales after origination. The model generates novel predictions linking loan and lender characteristics to initial retention, sales dynamics, and loan performance.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhae021
A Theory of the Term Structure of Interest Rates under Limited Household Risk Sharing
原刊和作者:
The Review of Financial Studies Volume 37, Issue 8
Indrajit Mitra (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta)
Yu Xu (University of Delaware)
Abstract
We present a theory in which the interaction between limited sharing of idiosyncratic labor income risk and labor adjustment costs (that endogenously arise through search frictions) determines interest rate dynamics. In the general equilibrium, the interaction of these two ingredients relates bond risk premiums, cross-sectional skewness of income growth, and labor market tightness. Our model rationalizes an upward-sloping average yield curve and predicts a negative relation between labor market tightness and bond risk premiums. We provide evidence for our theory’s mechanism and predictions.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhae011
Digitalization and Retirement Contribution Behavior: Evidence from Administrative Data
The Review of Financial Studies Volume 37, Issue 8
Claudio Daminato (Lund University)
Massimo Filippini (Università della Svizzera Italiana)
Fabio Haufler (ETH Zurich)
Abstract
Retirement savings decisions are increasingly mediated by digital technologies that promise to help individuals plan adequately for their retirement. We exploit a natural experiment to show that introducing a digital pension application increases the probability of making a voluntary retirement contribution by 1.8 percentage points, from an average pretreatment contribution rate of 2.8%. Men and higher-income earners are more likely to respond to the app introduction. We then leverage a field experiment to show that using the app affects contribution behavior mainly through reducing the “hassle” costs of making contributions, rather than by providing information on the associated tax savings.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhae015