本文精选了经济学国际顶刊《American Economic Review》近期发表的论文，提供经济学领域最新的学术动态。

Similarity of Information and Collective Action

原刊和作者：

American Economic Review, Volume 116, Issue 4

Deepal Basak （Kelley School of Business）

Joyee Deb （New York University）

Aditya Kuvalekar （University of Essex）

Abstract

We study a canonical collective action game with incomplete information. Individuals attempt to coordinate to achieve a shared goal, while also facing a temptation to free-ride. More similar information can help them coordinate, but it can also exacerbate free-riding. Our main result shows that more similar information facilitates (impedes) achieving the common goal when it is sufficiently challenging (easy). We apply this insight to show why less powerful authoritarian governments may face larger protests if they restrict press freedom, when committee diversity is beneficial in costly voting, and when a more diverse community contributes more to public good provision.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20241056

A Long and a Short Leg Make for a Wobbly Equilibrium

原刊和作者：

American Economic Review, Volume 116, Issue 4

Nicolae Gârleanu （Washington University）

Stavros Panageas （University of California）

Geoffery Zheng （New York University Shanghai）

Abstract

We provide a model to explain how the interaction between the spot and lending markets for stocks can lead to abrupt changes in short selling activity. Furthermore, rational short sellers may choose to abandon the market even as mispricing widens. We document empirically that the dynamics of short selling are fat tailed and subject to abrupt changes, especially for the stocks that the model identifies as susceptible to such dynamics.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20211548

Real Credit Cycles

原刊和作者：

American Economic Review, Volume 116, Issue 4

Pedro Bordalo （University of Oxford）

Nicola Gennaioli （Bocconi University）

Andrei Shleifer （Harvard University）

Stephen J. Terry （The University of Michigan）

Abstract

We embed diagnostic expectations in a workhorse neoclassical model with heterogeneous firms and risky debt. A realistic degree of overreaction estimated from US firms' earnings forecasts generates realistic credit cycles. Good times produce economic and financial fragility, predicting future disappointment of expectations, low bond returns, and investment declines. To generate the size of spread increases observed during 2007–2009, the model requires only moderate negative shocks. Diagnostic expectations offer a realistic, parsimonious way to produce financial reversals in business cycle models.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20211820

Market Power and Capital Constraints

原刊和作者：

American Economic Review, Volume 116, Issue 4

Milena Wittwer （Columbia University）

Jason Allen （Purdue University）

Abstract

We explore how traders' equity capitalization influences asset prices in a framework that accounts for market power. In our model, traders with capital constraints engage in transactions in an imperfectly competitive market. We demonstrate that looser capital constraints elevate both asset prices and price impact, the latter diminishing market liquidity. Using Canadian Treasury auction data, we illustrate how to apply our model to quantify these effects. We estimate the shadow costs of capital constraints by leveraging a temporary policy exemption during 2020–2021. We show that while these constraints are only infrequently binding, their relative impact when activated can be sizable.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20231202

Robust Misspecified Models

American Economic Review, Volume 116, Issue 4

Cuimin Ba （The University of Pittsburgh）

Abstract

This paper studies which misspecified models are likely to persist when decision-makers compare them with competing models. The main result characterizes such models based on two features that can be derived from primitives: The model's asymptotic accuracy in predicting the equilibrium distribution of observed outcomes and the "tightness" of the prior around such equilibria. Misspecified models can be robust, persisting against any arbitrary competing model—including the true model—despite decision-makers observing an infinite amount of data. Moreover, simple misspecified models equipped with entrenched priors can be more robust than complex correctly specified models.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20240246