Given the special status of the stock analysts in Chinese securities markets and the extensive existence of herding behaviors and their profound impacts on the market , we propose a model to test the herding behaviors of the stock analysts on the consensus while they make predictions on the futures movement of the market returns. We fo2 cus on the existence of the herding behaviors , the interior and exterior factors that influence the herding behaviors and the rationality of the herding behaviors. The main conclusions are as follows : there are significant herding be2 haviors on the consensus of the analysts. As the history returns increase , the optimistic sentiment in the markets in2 crease , the degree of the uniform of the predictions of the analysts increases , the abilities of the analysts decreases and the initial reputations of them increases , the incentives of the analysts to herd on consensus increase. The re2 search on the rationality of the herding behaviors indicates that the degree of herding increases when the consensus is proved to be wrong by the ex post return. Therefore , the herding of the stock analysts is more likely to be a kind of irrational behavior.