股权分置改革中股东间博弈的实证研究
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Positivistic research on the usage of game theory in split-share structure reform
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    摘要:

    股权分置问题是中国证券市场最大的制度症结,股权分置改革的过程是非流通股股东与流通股股东之间,就非流通股获得流通权应支付的对价而进行的持续博弈过程.首先论述了股权分置改革中的博弈论基础,就股东间博弈的行为,博弈过程中股东的收益、股东的策略选择、博弈结果对市场平均对价水平的影响进行了论述;其次,研究了股权分置改革中以博弈论为基础的股东协商机制问题,并就股东间博弈的有效性进行了实证研究;最后,对投票表决制下的有关问题做出了分析并提出了建议

    Abstract:

    The biggest obstacle in China's stock market is the problem of its split-share structure. The process of split-share structure reform is a ‘game' between tradable share's holders and non-tradable share's holders. In the game, the two kinds of shareholders bargain on the consideration that non-tradable shareholders should pay to tradable shareholders. In this article, we firstly explained : what kind of game the reform is, the gains and strategies of the opponents in the game and their influence on average consideration. Secondly, we dug into the negotiation scheme between different kinds of shareholders in split-share structure reform based on game theory and then we did some positivistic research on the effectiveness of the game between different kinds of shareholders. Finally, we analyzed some problems under the network voting system and made our suggestions

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苏梅 寇纪淞 陈富赞.股权分置改革中股东间博弈的实证研究[J].管理科学学报,2006,9(1):

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