Research Center of Cluster and Enterprise Development,School of Business Administration ,Jiangxi Uni versity of Finance and Economics,Nanchang 330013,China; Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science,Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190,China; 在知网中查找 在百度中查找 在本站中查找
Inventory pledge financing in the innovative mode of logistics finance can effectively solve capital bottleneck in the supply chain and has a lot scope to develop. However,it is seriously constrained by the level of risk control. This paper focuses on loantovalue ratios,i. e. the core indicator of risk in seasonal inventory financing in the uniform credit mode. Based on the features of this mode and the relevant costbenefit structure,we build a newsvendor model with financial constraints and analyze reordering decisions made by riskneutral borrowers. Then,based on a dynamic Stackelberg game between borrowers and logistics enterprises, we investigate loantovalue ratio decisions of downsideriskadverse logistics enterprises. The results show that in uniform credit mode,downsideriskaverse logistics enterprises should set loantovalue ratios according to different borrowers’reordering plans and then make their optimal decisions. Moreover,for the borrowers with different initial inventory,downsiderisk limits affect the optimal decision of logistics enterprises differently.