Based on CVaR risk measure criterion，this paper investigates revenue sharing contracts ( RSC) for a supply chain with a risk-averse retailer and sales effort effect，from which some managerial insights are developed．It discusses the retailer’s optimal ordering decision and promotional effort decision．It explores the channel coordination issue via a conventional RSC and an improved RSC，and analyses the relationships between the contract parameters．It concludes that，when the wholesale price is given，the more risk-averse the retailer is，the bigger the ratios of its revenue-sharing and cost-sharing are under the improved RSC． Finally，it investigates the impact of the retailer’s promotional effort and risk aversion on the feasible domain of RSCs， and points out that both the sales effect and risk aversion reduce the feasible range of the efficient contracts， and the introduction of cost-sharing mechanism helps eliminate the adverse impact of promotional effect on the contract feasible region．