This paper studies how the controlling shareholders’financial constraints influence their tunneling behavior and related economic consequences from the perspective of controlling shareholders’stock pledge and freezing．We have documented strong evidence suggesting that: When the controlling shareholders are facing serious financial constraints ( when the equity is pledged or frozen) ，they tend to tunnel more money from lis_x005fted companies，which has negative effects on both the accounting performances and market values of listed companies．At the same time，although the tunneling behavior of large shareholders under financial constraints is greatly mitigated by the external supervision and internal balance power，the above results are still statistically significant even when external supervision and internal balance power are stronger．The above results show that，using stock pledge as a proxy for financial constraint and tunneling incentive of controlling shareholders is more powerful to explain the behavior of controlling shareholders．This study provides not only an analytical perspective and empirical variables to the existing controlling shareholders and corporate governance literature，but also important references for the regulators to monitor the behavior of controlling shareholders and for outside investors to make investment decisions．