Ｒecent literature on two-sided market theory mainly focuses on single-period game theory，and o-mits dynamic pricing in multi-period games． This disagrees with the reality that agents always make multiple transactions and that platforms face dynamic pricing． After building a two-sided duopoly platforms model con-sidering consumer satisfaction，the paper analyzes the optimal prices under different pricing strategies ( uniform pricing or discrimination pricing) and different strategic targets ( short-term profits or long-term profits) ，and then discusses their applicability and validity． It is found that a higher first-period market share can ensure neither a higher second-period market share nor the repeated purchase ratio; Discrimination pricing strategy is good for the platform’s profit，but bad for agents’utility and social welfare． ( Discrimination pricing，Dis-crimination pricing) strategy is a Pareto-dominant equilibrium，and the total social welfare of the two periods is not related to the platform’s strategic target，but related to its pricing strategy．