Considering concentrated ownership，the unique tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders in China is studied． This study combines the“Entrenchment Effect”and“Bargaining Effect”to create a theoretical model on how anti-takeover provisions have affected the decision making of controlling shareholders and acquiring firms． From the minority shareholders'viewpoint，the mechanism and effect of anti-takeover provisions on shareholders'wealth，as well as the market for corporate control is explored． Subsequently，the numerical analysis supports our hypothesis． Ｒesults indicate the following: Firstly，due to the“Entrenchment Effect”，the controlling shareholder' s tunneling increases with the enhancement of anti-takeover defenses; Secondly，for acquiring firms with only one best bid price，bid prices typically increase with the degree of antitakeover defenses; Thirdly，increasing anti-takeover defenses usually result in a noticeable drop of the probability of takeover; Lastly，when takeover bargaining premiums are insufficient to offset the controlling shareholders’tunneling， enhancements to a company's anti-takeover defenses typically result in a decrease in minority shareholders'wealth．