税制营改增下资金约束供应链的融资均衡
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F253.4; F830.56

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国家自然科学基金资助项目(71671153; 71171171)


Equilibrium financing in capital-constrained supply chains under replacing business tax with value-added tax
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    摘要:

    基于经典的报童模型框架研究了营业税改征增值税对资金约束供应链融资均衡的影响,该供应链包含 1 个生产性服务商和 1 个资金约束的制造商。制造商可以向竞争的银行市场或者生产性服务商贷款。研究表明,当只有一种信用可行时,在银行信用下,制造商的最优订购量在增值税税制下会更多; 在贸易信用下,生产性服务商的利润在增值税税制下会更高。在两种信用都可行下: 当无风险利率较小且服务成本较高(低) 时,银行信用(贸易信用) 是唯一的融资均衡; 当无风险利率较大时,贸易信用总是唯一的融资均衡。通过数值计算表明,供应链效率在增值税税制下会更高。所以,营改增有利于生产性服务业的发展和提高供应链效率,这在一定意义上支撑了国家营改增的合理性。

    Abstract:

    This paper,in the classical newsvendor framework,investigates the impact of replacing the business tax (BT) with the value-added tax (VTA) on equilibrium financing in a capital-constrained supply chain,where there are one productive servicer and one capital-constrained manufacturer.The manufacturer may borrow credit from a competitive bank market or from the productive servicer.When only one credit type is available under the VAT system,the manufacturer’s optimal order quantity will increase in the case of bank credit and the productive servicer can get more profit in the case of trade credit. When both bank and trade credits are available,the unique equilibrium financing is bank credit (trade credit) if the risk-free interest rate is relatively low and the service cost is relatively high (low) but is always trade credit if the risk-free interest rate is relatively high. Numerical studies show that the supply chain efficiency under the VAT system is higher than that under the BT system.Consequently,replacing BT with VAT is beneficial to the development of productive services sector and improvement of supply chain efficiency,which supports the rationality of this reform in some sense.

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林智平,徐迪.税制营改增下资金约束供应链的融资均衡[J].管理科学学报,2018,21(10):14~31

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  • 在线发布日期: 2021-10-25
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