In order to satisfy consumers’ desire, firms prefer to sell quality differentiated products to customers with different quality preference. But quality preferences make it difficult for firms selling specified products to new customers. For example, customers with low quality preferences are reluctant to buy high-quality products unless they can get a favorable price. So behavior-based pricing (BBP) is widely used to price discriminate between past and new customers. Through establishing two-period dynamic pricing models consisting of competing firms with game theory, this paper discusses behavior-based pricing (BBP) strategy of quality differentiated products, and we examine how BBP affect firms’ profits. Our main results show when firms should use BBP based on firms’ market position and relative production efficiency. Besides, it is found that BBP can increase the profits of less efficient firm, but decrease the profits of more efficient firm. However, BPD decreases both firms’ total profits if their efficiencies are similar. If only one firm can monopolize customer information and use BBP, such information monopoly advantage will ironically decrease his own profits, while it damages the competitor’s profits, thus resulting in a “lose-lose” situation.