At present,researchers and managers are concerned with the performance of the seven carbontrading pilots in China. Hence,this paper theoretically analyzes their performances from the initial allocation viewpoint of carbon emission rights. It is found that there exists a clustering effect of carbon trading in the pilots. The underlying reason for it is because of the mismatch of permits and the consequent adverse selection of enterprises. To eliminate the adverse selection from mechanism design,the paper introduces auctioning into the carbon-trading market. Moreover,based on China's actual conditions,an asymmetric auction model of rights is developed by constructing the abatement investment return index and defining the socially optimal rights allocation. In our model,enterprises' asymmetric equilibrium bidding strategies and their abatement investment decision before the auction are investigated,respectively. Then,the effects of the enterprise ownership differences on abatement investment and allocation are examined. Finally,the effectiveness regarding the low-carbon government subsidy is discussed and associated options are suggested in order to improve China's carbon-trading market.