Differing from the current studies which focus on the process management or the reduction of the information asymmetry， this paper establishes an incentive compatible outsourcing contract model for Ｒ＆D in CoPS． The following results are derived by comparing three models—the standard game model( model I) ， the modified game model embedded with quality guarantee( model II) ， and the improved model embedded with the bi-direction option of sharing and penalty( model III) : 1) Process control( model I) ， cannot solve the problem of sub-optimal in whole ， nor can it eliminate the sub-contractor s lazy behavior; 2) To a certain extent，sub-contractors lazy behavior can be alleviated by quality guarantee( model II) ; 3) The improved contract ( model III) can solve the above two problems and achieve overall optimum， since information asymmetry will be eliminated when the sub-contractor income is decided by his own effort． This paper examines information asymmetry from a new perspective and solves the problems of sub-optimal in whole and laziness． It is an expansion and deepening of incentive compatibility theory and contract governance in outsourcing field， and it provides a new idea for outsourcing contract governance in management practices．