Ownership concentration and the resulted “insider control”constitute an important basis for the game between insiders and outside investors of listed companies in China. Within the framework of“reciprocal altruism”,this paper investigates whether and how corporate insiders interact with security analysts,by making use of information superiority,and damage the interests of outside investors. Using the data of reducing holding-shares of insiders and the rating data of analysts during the period 2007-2013,the following conclusions are drawn. Firstly,optimistic rating reports are usually intensively issued before insider selling,and the number of optimistic rating reports is positively associated with insider selling value. Secondly,the relation above exists in the insider selling of both non-executive shareholders and executive shareholders,and increases with the influence of the executives. Thirdly,this relation is more likely when the insiders have a stronger motivation to manage the corporate information environment. Fourthly,both the insiders and analysts benefit: the insiders gain excess earnings by selling shares while the analysts gain more private information. Such evidence supports the collusion idea between corporate insiders and security analysts. The findings in this paper comprehensively present the motivation,means and consequences of the reciprocal altruism between insiders and security analysts,promote the understanding of the interactive behaviors between corporate insiders and security analysts in emerging capital markets,and provide certain inspirations for supervisors in the regulation of information disclosure,fight against insider transactions and the maintanence of market order.