Abstract: The compensation incentive mechanism is an important part of modern corporate governance and the core issue of current state-owned enterprises reform. As a national governance mechanism, the central government has implemented Compensation Reform Program of the Central Enterprises Principal Responsible (hereinafter referred to as the Compensation Reform Program) in 2015. Will it have an incentive effect on central enterprises? Especially under the policy background of Eight Provision and Six Prohibition implemented by the central government, whether the Compensation Reform Program will improve the risk-taking level of central enterprises is the main issue we are concerned about. Under the framework of agency theory, using difference-in-difference approach (DID), we find that, compared with the central enterprises not affected by this policy, the risk-taking level of the central enterprises affected by this policy is significantly reduced, and the higher the promotion expectation of the executives, the greater the degree of competition and the longer the control chain level, the less the negative impact of this policy on the risk-taking behavior.Further research shows that the new policy inhibits the high-risk investment behavior of central enterprises, which is manifested in the lower debt financing rate; and after the implementation of the policy, the innovation efficiency of enterprises is lower (higher input but lower innovation output). The above test results mean that the effective incentive mechanism for the development of enterprises is the necessary condition to improve the efficiency of state-owned enterprises. Therefore, the research of this paper is helpful to deepen the dispute discussion of salary system reform, and provide theoretical basis and policy reference for further promoting the reform of state-owned enterprises and improving the efficiency of state-owned enterprises.