This paper constructs a chain-to-chain competition model consisting of two manufacturers and two exclusive retailers to explore the issue of channel strategy selection of extended warranties based on chain-to-chain competition. Three-types options of channel strategy of extended warranties are considered: both supply chains choose to provide extended warranties by manufacturers (MM), both supply chains choose to provide extended warranties by retailers (RR) and one supply chain chooses to provide extended warranties by manufacturer, and the other chooses to provide extended warranties by retailer (H). The results show that both MM and RR may become equilibrium strategies, and these two equilibrium strategies may exist separately or simultaneously from the perspective of the supply chain. Interestingly, from the perspective of manufacturers and retailers, we find that they do not always prefer to accept the same extended warranties’ channel strategy. There exist specific areas where manufacturers and retailers have conflicting strategic choices. Furthermore, in the chain-to-chain competition environment, the total system profit in the case of decentralized channel may be better than centralized channel.