The packaged payment motivates hospitals to pay more attention to cost control by transferring the responsibility of controlling medical expenses to doctors and hospitals, which will have a significant impact on the daily operation of hospitals. This paper mainly studies two payment methods, namely DRGs and DIP. By constructing a queuing-based game model, we consider the service rate competition between multiple homogeneous hospitals under these two payments and compare them under the same medical budget from various perspectives, such as medical quality, hospitals’ profit and social welfare. In addition, we study the impact of the number of hospitals and service cost coefficients on the system performance with a numerical case. We find that: 1) Compared with the DRGs, the service rate is relatively lower, the number of patients served is relatively small, but hospitals’ profit is greater under the DIP. 2) From the perspective of payer, DRGs is better when the cost of patient loss is higher, otherwise, DIP is better and DIP is a Pareto improvement strategy. 3) The advantages of DIP is more obvious when the number of hospitals is moderate and the service cost coefficient is large.