Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2009 to 2016，this paper examines how superstar CEOs affect negative information disclosure． Our results indicate that superstar CEOs will significantly increase the probability of bad news hoarding． Further research finds that the probability of financial restatement increases after CEOs become famous，and the likelihood of hiding negative information declines once superstar CEOs exit the list． Mechanism analysis shows that superstar CEOs suppress bad news through management power． In addition，superstar CEOs with lower earnings quality before their rise to fame are more likely to hide negative information after their rise to fame． These results indicate that although superstar CEOs may have the potential to improve company image，the fame might decrease the effectiveness of corporate internal governance． Our research expands the literature on how superstar CEOs influence company decision-making process，enriches the literature of bad news hoarding and sheds light on the dark side of media． The paper also has important practical implications for maintaining the stable and healthy development of capital market in China．