Recent developments in capital markets suggest that the behavior of independent directors is likely to be affected their nominating shareholders. This study investigates how the presence of multiple large shareholders influences the likelihood of independent director dissent. We document that independent directors dissent more frequently in firms with multiple large shareholders than in those dominated by a single large shareholder. The propensity to dissent is further amplified when ownership among large shareholders is more evenly distributed or when proposals are more directly tied to conflicts of interest among them. Cross-sectional analyses show that the positive association between multiple large shareholders and independent director dissent is stronger in firms with larger boards, no absolute controlling shareholder, and lower economic policy uncertainty. By contrast, analyst coverage and media attention mitigate this association. Finally, we provide evidence that the value-enhancing effect of independent director dissent is more pronounced in firms with a single large shareholder but attenuated in those with multiple large shareholders. Overall, this study advances the theoretical understanding of independent director dissent, contributes to the literature on the effectiveness of independent directors, and may offer implications for strengthening the independent director system and fostering sustainable corporate development.