The design of incentive mechanism in the context of principal-agent is an important subject of management science research． However，existing research pays less attention to how to incentivize agents who engage in risky decisions． The paper considers the effect of fund managers’performance incentives on asset prices in an experimental stock market in the context of principal-agent dynamics by introducing both the roles of investors and fund managers． The results show that mispricing is common in experimental stock markets no matter fund managers face linear incentive ( proportional to fund return) ，convex incentive ( reward good fund performance) or concave incentive ( penalize bad fund performance) ． Further，benchmark-linked convex and concave incentives could lead to a significantly higher level of mispricing than linear incentives． At the same time，the risk attitude and overconfidence of fund managers can significantly affect the impact of incentives on mispricing． In addition，the incentive mechanism affects the mispricing of stocks by influencing the risk-taking behavior of fund managers rather than herd behavior． Exploring the relationship between the micro-level fund manager incentive mechanism and the macro-level market mispricing has reality significance for the institutional design of fund companies，for the strengthening of the prudential supervision of institutional investors’portfolio risks by the regulatory authorities，and for the maintenance of financial market stability．