碳交易机制下基于互惠的供应链广告合作与减排成本分担契约
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Co-op advertising and carbon emission reduction cost-sharing contracts in coordinating supply chain with reciprocal behavior under cap-and-trade regulation
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    摘要:

    以两级低碳供应链为研究对象,制造商进行碳减排,零售商进行广告宣传,在碳交易机制下构建博弈模型研究低碳供应链上下游企业间的减排与广告决策,将互惠引入低碳供应链的策略互动过程中开展相应的优化决策与协调机制研究.研究发现:1)在互惠系数的合理取值范围内,无论制造商互惠偏好程度如何,通过广告合作-减排成本分担组合契约可以使低碳供应链实现完美协调.当制造商为高度的利他偏好者时,仅需通过广告合作契约就可以实现低碳供应链的完美协调;制造商非高度的利他偏好者时,单一的广告合作契约只能在一定程度上缓解低碳供应链的双重边际效应,无法实现完美协调.2)低碳供应链在双向合作模式下将获得最高的利润,也产生最多的碳排放,并且供应链整体利润和碳排放总量均与互惠系数无关;单一广告合作模式下,供应链整体利润和碳排放总量均随互惠系数的增大而增大;无合作情形下,供应链整体利润随互惠系数增大而增大,碳排放总量随互惠系数增大而降低,制造商的互惠偏好既有利于经济目标,也有利于环境目标.3)无论采用何种合作模式,碳排放总量均随消费者低碳偏好和广告影响系数的增大呈先增后减的变化趋势.当消费者低碳偏好较低或广告影响系数较小时,双向合作模式下的碳排放量最多,并且随着消费者低碳偏好或广告影响系数的增大,双向合作模式下的碳排放总量将率先达峰然后急剧下降.

    Abstract:

    This paper integrates manufacturers’carbon emission reduction and retailers’low-carbon advertising into the analysis framework and introduces reciprocity into the strategies interactions of the low-carbon supply chain. By constructing and solving game-theoretic models, this paper tries to carry out the optimization decision-making and coordination mechanisms research. The results show that: 1) Regardless of the manufacturer’s reciprocal preference, the low-carbon supply chain can be perfectly coordinated through a combined contract of co-op advertising and carbon emission reduction cost-sharing. When the manufacturer has a highly altruistic preference, the low-carbon supply chain can be perfectly coordinated through the co-op advertising contract. When the manufacturer does not have a highly altruistic preference, the co-op advertising contract can only mitigate the double marginal effectsbut cannot achieve perfect coordination. 2) Under the two-way cooperation mode, the low-carbon supply chain generates the most carbon emissions while obtaining the highest profit. Both the overall profit and total carbon emissions are independent of the reciprocity coefficient. Under the advertising cooperation mode, both the overall profit of the supply chain and the total amount of carbon emissions increase as the reciprocity coefficient increases. Without any cooperation, the overall profit of the supply chain increases with the reciprocity coefficient, while the total carbon emissions decrease with the reciprocity coefficient. The reciprocal preference of the manufacturer is not only conducive to economic goals but also conducive to environmental goals. 3) No matter which cooperation mode is adopted, the total carbon emissions will first increase and then decrease with consumers’ low-carbon preference and advertising influence coefficient. When consumers’ low-carbon preference or advertising influence coefficient is small, the carbon emissions under the two-way cooperation mode are the highest.As consumers’ low-carbon preference or advertising influence coefficient increases, total carbon emissions under the two-way cooperation mode will first reach apeak and then decline sharply.

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石平,韩坤,后锐.碳交易机制下基于互惠的供应链广告合作与减排成本分担契约[J].管理科学学报,2024,(12):57~81

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  • 在线发布日期: 2025-02-06
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