应对供应商掺假行为的区块链+延期支付策略
DOI:
作者:
作者单位:

作者简介:

通讯作者:

中图分类号:

基金项目:


Managing suppliers’ product adulteration behavior via blockchain+deferred payment strategy
Author:
Affiliation:

Fund Project:

  • 摘要
  • |
  • 图/表
  • |
  • 访问统计
  • |
  • 参考文献
  • |
  • 相似文献
  • |
  • 引证文献
  • |
  • 资源附件
  • |
  • 文章评论
    摘要:

    针对一个买家和两个供应商组成的供应链,考虑供应商存在掺假行为,构建信息不对称下买家主导的委托代理模型,分析了买家采用延期支付策略或结合区块链的延期支付策略对供应链质量管理的影响.通过比较买家在采用延期支付和区块链+延期支付策略下的均衡结果,分析两种策略下供应商的掺假动机、掺假被发现的概率等对买家决策和供应链利润的影响,揭示出区块链在供应链质量管理中的价值和各方动机.研究表明:在延期支付策略下,买家需根据供应商掺假时问题产品被消费者发现的边际概率制定三种不同的最优策略;在区块链+延期支付策略下,因为买家可以追溯到掺假的供应商而仅需一种策略.采用区块链可以降低买家质量管理的复杂性,但不一定能增加买家和供应链的利润.当供应商的掺假动机较高或两个供应商同时掺假被消费者发现的概率较低时,买家更适合采用区块链.区块链+延期支付策略相较传统延期支付策略将使供应商的利润受损或保持不变.因此,在特定条件下,买家应通过转移支付来提升供应商的利润以促使供应商接受采用区块链,实现供应链协调.

    Abstract:

    For a supply chain with two suppliers and a buyer, this paper studies the impact of the deferred payment strategy and the blockchain+deferred payment strategy on supply chain quality management,taking supplier adulteration into account, by constructing a principal-agent model in which the buyer acts as the leader under asymmetric information. Specifically, by comparing the equilibrium results under the deferred payment strategy and the blockchain + deferred payment strategy, this paper analyzes the impacts of factors such as the supplier’s adulteration motivations and the probability of adulteration being discovered on buyer’s decisions and supply chain profits, and reveals the value of blockchain technology in supply chain quality management as well as the incentives for supply chain members to adopt it. The result suggests that, under deferred payment strategy, the buyer needs to make three different optimal policies according to the marginal probability of the adulterated product being found by customers. However, under the blockchain+deferred payment strategy, the buyer’s optimal policy is unique due to traceability. Though adopting blockchain can reduce the complexity of buyer’s quality management, it may not necessarily increase the profits of both the buyer and the supply chain. When the supplier’s motivation for adulteration is high, or the probability that two suppliers adulterate at the same time is detected by consumers is low, the buyer is more inclined to adopt blockchain. Compared to the traditional deferred payment strategy, the blockchain + deferred payment strategy may reduce the supplier’s profit or leave it unchanged. Therefore, under certain conditions, the buyer should improve the supplier’s profits through transfer payments to achieve supply chain coordination.

    参考文献
    相似文献
    引证文献
引用本文

陈晓红,张维东,王傅强.应对供应商掺假行为的区块链+延期支付策略[J].管理科学学报,2025,(12):123~137

复制
分享
文章指标
  • 点击次数:
  • 下载次数:
  • HTML阅读次数:
  • 引用次数:
历史
  • 收稿日期:
  • 最后修改日期:
  • 录用日期:
  • 在线发布日期: 2026-01-28
  • 出版日期:
您是第位访问者
管理科学学报 ® 2026 版权所有
通讯地址:天津市南开区卫津路92号天津大学第25教学楼A座908室 邮编:300072
联系电话/传真:022-27403197 电子信箱:jmsc@tju.edu.cn