With the increasing complexity of the supply chain, the supply chain members aim to find ways to establish longterm cooperation which is an effective means of sharing benefits and mitigating risks. Renegotiationproof contract plays an important role in longterm cooperation. This paper investigates the twoperiod cooperation between the manufacturer and retailer, considering that the retailer’s types (i.e., demand types) change stochastically across periods under demand uncertainty. This paper models three types of longterm contracts under asymmetric information and examines the optimal renegotiationproof contract. The results show that the serial correlation of the retailer’s types influences the optimal renegotiationproof contract. Specifically, as the correlation increases, the optimal renegotiationproof contract consists of a separate contract with full commitment, a separate contract with commitment and renegotiation, and a pooling contract with commitment and renegotiation, respectively. The separate contract with full commitment is consistent with the optimal renegotiationproof contract when the correlation is small, since the information obtained in the first period cannot be used to design the contract in the second period when the retailer’s type changes significantly over periods. The separate and pooling contracts with commitment and renegotiation can be updated with the firstperiod signal. However, the pooling contract with commitment and renegotiation is the optimal renegotiationproof contract when the manufacturer prefers the secondperiod expected profit over that of the first period.