As China’s platform antitrust regulation transitions toward normalized governance, coercive exclusivity practices have been effectively curbed. However, platforms may continue to compete for exclusive listing agreements with superstar sellers through voluntary bidding mechanisms, a form of competition inadequately studied by scholars and regulators. To analyze platform competition over non-coercive exclusive listing agreements and its implications, this paper develops a four-stage game-theoretic model in which two asymmetric two-sided platforms compete for exclusive listing agreements with a superstar seller. Competition occurs through voluntary bidding rather than coercive measures, with target sellers retaining autonomy over multi-homing or single-homing decisions. The paper finds that: 1) Exclusive agreement competition disrupts the “winner-takes-all” equilibrium, enabling vertically disadvantaged platforms to prevail through superior horizontal compatibility with superstar sellers; 2) Exclusive listing agreements with superstar sellers possessing sufficient influence over consumers can simultaneously enhance consumer surplus and ordinary seller welfare; 3) When platforms exhibit comparable competitive capabilities, exclusive agreement competition generates a Pareto-inefficient “prisoner’s dilemma”. These findings provide theoretical insights into platform competition for exclusive listing agreements and platform regulatory policy-making.